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Abstract
This paper presents the Conditional Probability of Default (CoPoD) methodology for modelling
the probabilities of loan defaults (PoDs) by small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) and unlisted
firms as functions of identifiable macroeconomic and financial variables. The process of modelling
PoDs represents a challenging task, since the time series of PoDs usually contain few observations,
thus making ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation imprecise or unfeasible. CoPoD improves the
measurement of the impact of macroeconomic variables on PoDs and consequently the measurement
of loans’ credit risk through time, thereby making a twofold contribution. First, econometrically, it
recovers estimators that show greater robustness than OLS estimators in finite sample settings under
the Mean Square Error criterion. Second, economically, on the basis of economic theory and empirical
evidence, CoPoD can incorporate a procedure to select a relevant set of macroeconomic explanatory
variables that have an impact on the PoDs. We implement CoPoD with information from Norway and
Mexico.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, macroeconomic cycles have frequently been associated with cycles in bank lending
and asset prices, often followed by episodes of stress in the financial system. There have been numerous
episodes in which banks’ portfolio credit losses (unexpected losses) have completely or nearly exhausted
the banking system’s capital.1 Along these lines, Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2004) show that,
after the 1992 Norwegian crisis, estimates of annual bank portfolio unexpected losses increased on average
47.73% from the levels recorded just before the crisis, while the annual level of empirical frequencies of
loan defaults (PoDs) by small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) and unlisted firms increased on average
55.42%. Equally, in Mexico, after the 1994 crisis, estimations of quarterly bank portfolio unexpected losses
increased on average 69.61% from the levels recorded just before the crisis, while the quarterly level of
PoDs increased on average 18.56%.2 Therefore, the proper measurement of financial institutions’ credit
risk should include macroeconomic developments and consequently changes in risk through time.
In this paper, we present a methodology for the modelling of the empirical frequencies of loan defaults
(PoDs) by SMEs and unlisted firms as functions of identifiable macroeconomic and financial variables.3
This allows us to obtain PoDs conditional on the business cycle. We therefore refer to this procedure as the
conditional probability of default (CoPoD) methodology. CoPoD not only allows one to measure changes
in risk as macroeconomic conditions change, it also improves such measurement from an econometric and
economic perspective, thus, improving the measurement of loans’ credit risk through time.
In order to model the impact of macroeconomic and financial developments on PoDs, risk managers and
regulators have commonly used ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation procedures. When attempting to
do so, they usually face a challenging problem, since frequently the number of observations on the time
series of PoDs barely exceeds the number of parameters to be estimated. Under these circumstances,
the recovered parameters indicating the impact of diﬀerent macroeconomic and financial variables on PoDs
possess large variances and are very sensitive to small changes in the data, thus making the measurement of
the impact of macroeconomic developments on loans’ credit risk imprecise. We claim that CoPoD improves
the measurement of the impact of macroeconomic developments on loans’ credit risk by making a twofold
contribution. First, econometrically, the proposed methodology, based on the Jaynes (1957) generalized
maximum entropy rule (GME), recovers estimators that in the setting of finite samples are superior to
OLS estimators under the Mean Square Error (MSE) criterion. Second, economically, on the basis of a
hypothesis that is consistent with economic theory and empirical evidence, a procedure is proposed to
select the set of explanatory variables that have a significant eﬀect on loans’ credit risk.
This hypothesis implies that diverse incentive structures have been created and significant economic
structural changes have taken place in countries that have liberalized financial systems. Under such eco-
nomic frameworks, fluctuations in key macroeconomic and financial variables have the potential to generate
endogenous cycles in credit, economic activity and asset prices. These cycles, in turn, appear to involve and
indeed may amplify financial imbalances, which can place great stress on the financial system. As a result,
an analysis of these variables may be able to provide significant information about systemic vulnerabilities
in the economy, which have the potential to increase loans’ credit risk. This hypothesis is consistent with
theoretical models with credit constraints and a financial accelerator,4 and with theories that emphasize
the importance of the incentive structures created under financial liberalization that can exacerbate the
intensity of such cycles. The relevant economic theory includes second-generation models in the currency
1See Caprio and Klingebiel (1996).
2Unexpected losses (UL) were computed as the 99.9% value at risk of the portfolio profit and loss distribution. The latter
was estimated with a structural portfolio credit risk model. In Norway, UL went from an average of 7.5% of risk weighted
assets to an average of 11.08%, while the annual average level of PoDs (for the specific risk-rating class of loans that was
analysed in this paper) rose from 7% to 10.88%. In Mexico, UL went from an average of 10.4 % of risk weighted assets to an
average of 17.64%, while the annual average level of PoDs (for the specific risk-rating class of loans that was analysed in this
paper) went from 13.9 % to 16.48%. It has been reported that the financial system in Mexico was already stressed in 1994,
before the outset of the crisis. This might be a possible explanation of why the level of PoDs just before the crisis was already
very high, i.e.13.9%. Source, Norges Bank and Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (Financial Regulatory Agency in
Mexico).
3The implementation of CoPoD may prove to be highly relevant since in most countries, SMEs and unlisted firms represent
the backbone of the economy, making a significant contribution to their GDP and to the sustainability of their employment
levels. Furthermore, loans granted to SMEs and unlisted companies usually represent an important percentage of the assets
held by most commercial banks.
4 See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
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crisis literature, which stress the role of self-fulfilling expectations and herding behavior in determining the
intensity of the cycles; models that point out that under financial liberalization the scope for risk-taking
is increased; and theories that call attention to the creation of perverse mechanisms, such as moral hazard
lending and carry trades, that under financial liberalization can exacerbate banking and currency crises.5
This hypothesis is also consistent with the empirical evidence.6
In this paper, we present an empirical implementation of CoPoD with two databases containing infor-
mation on the empirical frequencies of default experienced by loans given to SMEs and unlisted companies
in Norway and Mexico. These databases are provided by Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway) and by
Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (Mexican financial regulatory agency) respectively. For Norway,
we have yearly observations from 1988 to 2001. For Mexico, we have quarterly observations from the
second quarter of 1995 to the last quarter of 2000. The dataset is one of a few that cover an entire business
cycle for both countries under analysis and focus on SMEs and unlisted borrowers;7 however, the number
of observations is still small in statistical terms. This data set is not without its diﬃculties, as we discuss
later in the paper. Nevertheless, despite the limitations of the data, we were able to find regularities in
the explanatory power of lagged fluctuations of the ratio of credit to GDP and lagged fluctuations of real
asset prices on the PoDs of both countries. These findings are in line with the central hypothesis advanced
in this paper, as well as with previous empirical studies. Moreover, this exercise shows that CoPoD is
applicable in settings that suﬀer from information scarcity in both developed and developing economies.8
While we restrict our attention to loans, CoPoD can easily be extended to measure the eﬀect of macro-
economic developments on the loss given default (LGD), a variable that is also relevant in the estimation
of the profit and loss distribution (PLD) of loan portfolios and that is subject to similar or more stringent
data limitations than PoDs.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2, we provide the motivation behind the CoPoD. We
detail the CoPoDs econometric set up and solve for the CoPoD estimators. We continue reproducing the
large and finite sample properties (Golan, Judge and Miller, 1997) of the generalized maximum entropy
(GME) rule, which is the theoretical backbone of CoPoD. Based on these properties, those authors show
that in a setting of finite samples, GME estimators are weakly superior to OLS estimators under the
Mean Square Error (MSE) criterion.9 In Section 3, we elaborate the main hypothesis setting out the
conditions that are likely to generate financial stress in the economy. In Section 4, we present the proposed
procedure to select the explanatory variables to include in the model. We start by describing the initial set of
macroeconomic and financial variables that according to various theoretical arguments provide information
on financial vulnerabilities in the system. We also describe the dependent variables and then we describe
the procedure used to select the set of explanatory variables. Next, we present the sets of explanatory
variables that, under diﬀerent specifications, were chosen for Norway and Mexico. In Section 5, using the
explanatory variables that were chosen, we implement CoPoD to recover their parameters. In Section 6,
we perform a Monte Carlo experiment that shows with an empirical application the quantification of the
gain in eﬃciency of the CoPoD estimators relative to OLS estimators. In Section 7, we oﬀer an analysis
of the results and note the consistency of our results with theoretical arguments and empirical evidence.
5See Obstfeld (1995), Calvo (1998) and Flood and Marion (1999) for the first. See Allen and Gale (1998) for the second
and Garber and Lall (1996) and Dooley (1997) for the third.
6There is a growing literature documenting this empirical evidence. See Heiskanen (1993), Frankel and Rose (1996),
Mishkin (1997), Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart
(1998), Goldstein, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), Eichengreen and Areta (2000), Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2001), Borio and
Lowe (2002), Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2004).
7With few exceptions, e.g. Berger and Udell (1990) and Jimenez and Saurina (2004b), much of the existing literature on
credit risk relies on data referring to only one time period or, at best, to short time series. Frequently, the datasets used are
biased towards big firms and publicly traded companies.
8Time series of PoDs are usually very short in both developed and developing economies. The Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) clearly acknowledges such data restrictions. “The state of credit risk management in the banking industry
is rather paradoxical. Credit risk is simultaneously the new and old frontier. New, because, until recent years, so little had
been done at the conceptual and practical level to address it. The most evident symptom is the extraordinary dearth of
data which makes it diﬃcult to obtain reliable estimates: most banks have systematically been throwing this data away, not
realizing that it could represent their ultimate comparative advantage. Old, because, since the origins of the industry, credit
risk has been by far the most common source of banking distress and failure”. Speech by A. Crockett (2002).
9Weakly superior refers to the fact that theoretical results derived by Golan, Judge and Miller (1997), indicate that, under
the MSE criterion, in finite sample settings, the GME estimators are superior to OLS estimators. However; asymptotically,
both estimators are equivalent.
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Finally, our conclusions are summarized in Section 8.
2 Conditional probability of default (CoPoD) methodology
2.1 CoPoD: rationale
The set-up of our problem begins within the Merton (1974) framework. Merton assumes that the value of
the assets of the borrower at time t, denoted by Sit, follows a geometric Brownian motion,
dSit
Sit
= µidt+ σidW it ,
where µi is the instantaneous asset return, σi is the instantaneous asset volatility and W it is a standard
Brownian Motion.
If it is also assumed that the initial logarithmic asset value is ln
£
Sit
¤
= 0, then
ln
£
SiT
¤
∼ N
h³
µi − 12σi
2
´
(T − t), σi
√
T − t
i
.
Therefore, we can represent the standardized logarithmic asset value of this borrower at time T , as
s(T ) =
ln[SiT ]−
?
µi− 12σ
i2
?
(T−t)
σi
√
T−t . As a result, s(T ) ∼ Φ (0, 1) . Moreover, this borrower is assumed to default
at some time T > t, if, at that time, the value of this borrower’s assets falls below a pre-specified barrier,
ait, which is usually modelled as a function of the borrower’s leverage structure. Therefore, default can be
characterized by s(T ) ≤ ait. Thus, at time t, the probability of default at time T is given by
PoDt = Φ
¡
ait
¢
, (1)
where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf ).
The empirical frequencies of loan defaults by SMEs and unlisted companies classified under a given
sectoral activity or risk-rating category, i.e., the ith category, are grouped in the T-dimensional vector
PoD.10 Each observation in the vector of frequencies of loan defaultsPoD represents the empirical measure
of probability of default for the ith type of companies at each point in time t. Since each observation in
the vector of PoDs is restricted to lie between 0 and 1, we make the following transformation
ai = Φ−1 (PoD) ,
where Φ(·) is the inverse standard normal cdf. In order to simplify the notation, we will write vector
ai as a, since our analysis will focus on specific sectoral activities or risk-rating categories of loans and
therefore it is not necessary to distinguish this variable by the ith superscript.
We are interested in modelling the empirical frequency of loan defaults as a function of identifiable
macroeconomic and financial developments X, therefore we can formalize the problem as11
a = Xβ + e, (2)
where a is a T-dimensional vector of noisy observations (transformation of the PoDs), X is a known (T x
K) matrix of macroeconomic and financial series and β is a K-dimensional vector of unknown coeﬃcients
that we are interested in estimating. Consequently, we know X, observe a and wish to determine the
unknown and unobservable parameter vector β. This is an inverse problem since we must recover β on
the basis of only indirect, partial or incomplete information.
A great challenge for the credit risk measurement of loans is the extraordinary lack of available data for
modelling. Obtaining any data on the evolution of credit risk through time is extremely diﬃcult. Many
10Classifications can also be characterized by sectoral economic activity, geographical domicile, etc. It is assumed that all
the firms within a given classification will exhibit homogeneous default behaviour.
11An alternative way to look at this problem is to assume that defaults reflect an underlying, continuous credit change
indicator (normal equivalent deviate in the language of probit analysis) that has a standard normal distribution. Thus, we
can formalize the problem as: PoD = Φ (Xβ + e) . Where the inverse normal CDF transformation converts this equation to
a linear problem a = Xβ + e.
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banks, even in industrialized countries, have only recently introduced rating and credit risk evaluation
systems. In emerging market economies or when analizing SMEs and unlisted firms in general, such
systems have only just started to be implemented. Most of the time, they simply do not exist. Under
these circumstances, we may find the problem specified in equation (2) to be ill-posed. This is because
either (i) the number of unknowns may be larger than the number of data points or (ii) the number of
observations barely exceeds the number of parameters to be estimated. In the first case, there are infinitely
many solutions that satisfy the basic relationship set up in this equation, so, using traditional procedures,
we have no basis for picking out a particular solution vector for β (i.e., the regression coeﬃcients of the X
variables are indeterminate). In the second case, the regression coeﬃcients, although determinate, possess
large standard errors (in relation to the coeﬃcients themselves), which means that the coeﬃcients cannot
be estimated with great precision. Consequently, OLS estimators can be very sensitive to small changes in
data,12 which represents an important problem for risk managers who try to evaluate the impact of specific
events on the credit risk of their portfolios.
Given this challenging situation, how can we proceed? Ill-posed problems can be addressed in two ways.
First, by incorporating additional restrictions such as convenient distributional assumptions, or second, by
defining a selection rule to select one of the infinitely many possible solutions. The first approach is adequate
only when the assumptions or restrictions are consistent with the data generating process. However, if
data restrictions are significant, limitations in data quality and/or quantity may introduce uncertainty
about the model and parameter estimates, making both model and parameter risks significant (Koyluoglu,
2003). Therefore, in order to avoid imposing arbitrary assumptions or restrictions, we employ the second
approach using an entropy decision rule. The emphasis of this rule is on recovering whatever information
is consistent with the data (Jaynes, 1957). We undertake an empirical application of the model defined by
Judge and Golan (1992). We then present those authors’ results regarding the large sample properties and
the theoretical distribution approximation of the GME point estimate for finite samples. On the basis of
these results, our empirical application’s results show that GME solutions exhibit reduced mean squared
error (MSE) relative to traditional competitors in finite sample settings. Alternatively, both estimators
achieve Cramer-Rao eﬃciency bounds; however, in small sample settings, OLS estimators are ineﬃcient
and GME estimators perform better under the MSE criterion. In Section 6 we present a simulation study
that supports this claim.
2.2 CoPoD: econometric modelling
Following Judge and Golan (1992), we reformulate the model set in equation (2) as follows. Suppose
that we have non-sample information about the unknown parameter and noise components β and e. For
example, we can have prior beliefs about the signs or ranges of plausible values for each of the unknowns.
Accordingly, the linear inverse model may be written in terms of random variables, and the estimation
problem is to recover probability distributions for β and e that reconcile the available prior information
with the observed sample information. It is important to emphasize that the random variables are merely
conceptual devices used to express the prior and sample knowledge in a mutually compatible format.
As a result, we treat each βk as a discrete random variable with a compact support 2 ≤M <∞ possible
outcomes.
If zk1 and zkM are the plausible extreme values (upper and lower bounds) of βk, we can express βk
as a convex combination of these two points. That is, there exists pk ∈ [0, 1] such that, for M = 2,
βk = pkzk1 + (1 − pk)zkM . We can do this for each element of β, and the parameter space, <, may be
represented by a compact hyperrectangle, L ⊂ RK . In a more general fashion, let zk be a set of M points
that span the kth dimension of L. Given an M-dimensional vector of positive weights that sum to one,
pk À 0, the kth parameter can be expressed as a convex combination of points zk with weights pk. These
convex combinations may be expressed in matrix form so that any β ∈ int(L), then, we can rewrite β = Zp,
where Z is a (K x KM) matrix and pÀ 0 is a KM -dimensional vector of weights.
We can also reformulate the vector of disturbances, e, and assume that is a random vector with finite
location and space parameters. Accordingly, we represent our uncertainty about the outcome of the error
process by treating each et as a finite and discrete random variable with 2 ≤ J < ∞ possible outcomes.
We also suppose that there exists a set of error bounds, vt1 and vtJ , for each et. With positive probability,
12See Gujarati (1995).
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for J = 2, each disturbance may be written as et = wtvt1 + (1 − wt)vtJ for wt ∈ [0, 1]. As above, J ≥ 2
may be used to express the parameters in a more general fashion. As before, we restrict the weights so as
to be strictly positive and to sum to 1 for each t. The T unknown disturbances may be written in matrix
form as e = Vw, where V is a (T x TJ) matrix and w is a TJ-dimensional vector of weights.
Using the reparameterized unknowns, β = Zp and e = Vw, Judge and Golan(1992) rewrite the General
Linear Model (GLM), equation (2) as
a = XZp+Vw. (3)
The model specified in equation (3) incorporates macroeconomic and financial developments and ac-
counts for possible noise in the data. Once we have this new specification of the model, we proceed with
the definition of the entropy decision rule that we use to recover the unknown parameters without impos-
ing arbitrary assumptions or restrictions. The objective of the GME rule is to choose the set of relative
frequencies, p and w, that could have been generated in the greatest number of ways consistent with what
is known.13
Thus, following Judge and Golan (1992), we select p,wÀ 0 to maximize
E(p,w) = −
"
KX
k=1
MX
m=1
pkm ln p
k
m
#
−
⎡
⎣
TX
t=1
JX
j=1
wtj lnw
t
j
⎤
⎦ , (4)
subject to the T moment-consistency constraints
at =
KX
k=1
MX
m=1
xtkzkmp
k
m +
JX
j=1
vtjw
t
j , (5)
and the K additivity restrictions corresponding to the probability distributions of each of the K parameters
βk, and the t = 1, ..., T additivity restrictions corresponding to the probability distributions of each of the
T disturbances, et
1 =
MX
m=1
pkm, (6)
1 =
JX
j=1
wtj .
Once the objective function and the set of restrictions are defined, we set the following Lagrangian
function
L = −
"
KX
k=1
MX
m=1
pkm ln p
k
m
#
−
⎡
⎣
TX
t=1
JX
j=1
wtj lnw
t
j
⎤
⎦ (7)
+
TX
t=1
λt
⎡
⎣at −
KX
k=1
MX
m=1
xtkz
k
mp
k
m −
JX
j=1
vtjw
t
j
⎤
⎦
+
KX
k=1
θk
"
1−
MX
m=1
pkm
#
+
TX
t=1
τ j
⎡
⎣1−
JX
j=1
wtj
⎤
⎦ .
13Because we are coping with partial-incomplete information, ill-posed inverse problems arise. Thus, we would like to use a
principle or formalism that provides us with the “best” conclusions possible based on the data available. In looking for such
a principle two requirements appear essential (Jaynes, 1984). We know something but we do not know everything or perhaps
not enough to proceed in a traditional way and we do not want to claim any more or any less than we know. These are
the guidelines in which the principle of maximum entropy (MED) is based. The entropy formalism seeks to make the “best”
predictions possible from the information that is available and provides a basis for transforming the later into a distribution
of probabilities describing our state of knowledge. The MED is developed in Appendix A.1.
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Note that λ ∈ RT , θ ∈ RK and τ ∈ RT .
In order to recover the probability vectors p and w, we maximize the Lagrangian function described in
equation (7).
Thus, the entropy solution for each bpkm and bwtj respectively, is given by
bpkm ³bλ´ = exp
h
−
PT
t=1
bλtxtkzkmi
Θk
³bλ´ , (8)
where Θk
³bλ´ =PMm=1 hexp h−PTt=1 bλtxtkzkmii and,
bwtj ³bλ´ = exp
h
−bλtvtji
Ψt
³bλ´ , (9)
where Ψt
³bλ´ =PJj=1 hexp h−bλtvtjii .
Once we recover the optimal probability vector bp, we are in a position to form point estimates of the
unknown parameter vector bβ as follows:
bβ = Zbp. (10)
On the other hand, the optimal probability vector cw, may also be used to form point estimates of the
unknown disturbance be = Vbw.
The GME rule provides a rationale for choosing a particular solution vector p, which is the density
that could have been generated in the greatest number of ways consistent with what is known (without
imposing arbitrary distributional assumptions). Because we do not want to assert more of the distribution
p than is known, we choose the p that is closest to the uniform distribution and also consistent with the
data provided by the moment constraints.
2.3 The unconstrained dual problem
In this section we specify the “unconstrained dual problem”. This is a dual formualtion of the GME rule
that is used to evaluate the large sample properties of the GME estimators.
For arbitrary λ ∈ RT , let p (λ) and w (λ) represent the functional form of the optimal GME proba-
bilities, defined in equations (8) and (9). If we substitute these into equation (7), where the optimal p (λ)
and w (λ) satisfy the adding up constraints, we formulate the dual objective as a function of the Lagrange
multipliers, λ. This function is defined as
9
L (λ) = −
"
KX
k=1
MX
m=1
pkm (λ) ln
¡
pkm (λ)
¢#
−
⎡
⎣
TX
t=1
JX
j=1
wtj (λ) ln
¡
wtj (λ)
¢⎤⎦ (11)
+
TX
t=1
λt
⎡
⎣at −
KX
k=1
MX
m=1
xtkz
k
mp
k
m (λ)−
JX
j=1
vtjw
t
j (λ)
⎤
⎦ .
= −
"
KX
k=1
MX
m=1
pkm (λ)
½∙
−
XT
t=1
λtxtkz
k
m
¸
− ln [Θ (λ)]
¾#
−
⎡
⎣
TX
t=1
JX
j=1
wtj (λ)
©£
−λtvtj
¤
− ln [Ψ (λ)]
ª⎤⎦ .
+
TX
t=1
λt
⎡
⎣at −
KX
k=1
MX
m=1
xtkzkmp
k
m (λ)−
JX
j=1
vtjw
t
j (λ)
⎤
⎦ .
=
TX
t=1
λtat +
KX
k=1
ln [Θk (λ)] +
TX
t=1
ln [Ψt (λ)] ≡M(λ).
Accordingly, within the maximum likelihood (ML) approach, the dual unconstrained function M(λ)
can be interpreted as a log- likelihood function. Specifically, M(λ), is the negative expected-loglikelihood
function for λ.14 Therefore, the dual version of the GME problem is to choose λ to minimize M(λ).
Minimizing M(λ) with respect to λ yields bλ , then, we can compute bp, bw, bβ and be by substitution. In
other words, the value min [M(λ)] equals the value max [E(p,w)] .15
The gradient of the dual objective M(λ) is the model consistency constraints in equation (5).
∇λM(λ) = a−XZp (λ)−Vw (λ) = 0. (12)
Note that the tth equation in ∇λM(λ) takes the form
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The second partial derivative of this equation with respect to λs is
∂2M
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k=1
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∂λs
−
JX
j=1
vtj
∂wtj (λ)
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, (13)
where
14To see this, recall that we have expressed our uncertainty about β and e by viewing them as random variables on supports Z
and V, respectively. If we view p (λ)and w (λ) as families of parametric probability mass functions for these random variables,
the joint likelihood function for a sample size N , may be written as N−1l(λ) = −
?
K?
k=1
M?
m=1
fkm ln p
k
m
?
−
?
T?
t=1
J?
j=1
rtj lnw
t
j
?
,
where fkm, r
t
j are the observed frequencies of outcomes z
k
m and v
t
j respectively. However, we can form an analog version of the
log-likelihood function by replacing the frequencies with the associated probabilities. By substitution, the previous equation
becomes E [l(λ)] = −
?
p (λ)0 lnp (λ)
?
−
?
w (λ)0 lnw (λ)
?
, which is the negative expected log-likelihood function for λ. To
ensure that E [l(λ)] satisfies the properties of the observed sample, we will optimize it (minimize it, since it is the negative
expected log-likelihood function) subject to the consistency contraints in equation (5). After simplifying the expression in
equation (11) and imposing the consistency constraints by substitution, we can see that the constrained expected log-likelihood
function is simply M(λ).
15The dual uncosntrained problem was originally developed by Alhassid et al (1978).
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In matrix form, this equation becomes the Hessian matrix of M(λ),which is expressed as
∇λλM(λ) = XΣZ(λ)X0 +ΣV(λ), (19)
where ΣZ(λ) and ΣV(λ) are the variance-covariance matrices for the distributions p (λ) and w (λ).
For any interior solution, (bp, bw), each of these variance terms is strictly positive, consequently, ΣZ and
ΣV are positive definite matrices.
Note that XΣZX0 is positive semi-definite when T > K. Since ΣV is positive definite, then equation
(19) is a positive definite matrix. By the suﬃcient condition for strict convexity, M(λ) is strictly convex
in λ and choosing λ to minimize M(λ) will yield a unique solution, bλ. See Appendix A.2.
2.4 Large sample properties
In order to compare the performance of the GME estimators with competing estimators it is useful to look
at their large sample properties.16 Golan, Judge and Miller (1997) make use of the dual formulation of
the problem to evaluate the large sample properties of the GME estimators. The authors show that the
asymptotic distribution of GME estimators can be derived by finding the distribution of cλT. Given thatcβT= Zp(cλT) is a continuous function of cλT, they use the δ-method (Spanos, 1986) to approximate the
distribution of cβT. These authors claim that under the conditions presented in Appendix A.3, the GME
estimators converge in probability to the following distribution
√
T
³cβT − β0´ =⇒ N £0,Q−1Σ∗Q−1¤ , (20)
where Q and Σ∗ are matrices defined as in Appendix A.3.
This distribution is identical to the limiting distribution of the standard OLS estimator. Intuitively,
the GME solution is asymptotically equivalent to the OLS estimator because the first-order conditions
(normal equations) are identical in the limit of T . Alternatively, both estimators achieve Cramer-Rao
eﬃciency bounds, however, on the basis of results presented in the following section, it is claimed that, in
small sample settings, OLS estimators are ineﬃcient and GME estimators perform better under the MSE
criteria.
16 In this section, we reproduce the large sample properties results derived by Golan, Judge and Miller (1997). For proofs
and detailed explanation, we refer the reader to the original article.
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2.5 Finite sample properties
Golan, Judge and Miller (1997) use the asymptotic normality property of the GME estimator, equation
(20), to approximate the distribution of the GME point estimate for finite samples. On the basis of the
limiting distribution of cβT, they specify the finite sample approximation as
cβT ∼ N hβ,ΣZ(cλT)X0XC−1DC0−1X0XΣZ(cλT)i , (21)
where
C =X0XΣZ(cλT)X0X+ΣV(cλT), (22)
D = X0ΣeX,
where V ar(e) =
P
e. Note that if the GME problem is specified as a pure inverse problem (i.e., the
structure of the error term in equation (3) is not included), the ΣV terms disappear. It is interesting to
see that, in this case, if ΣZ is full rank, the variance-covariance matrix of cβT is (X0X)−1X0ΣeX (X0X)−1,
which is identical to the variance-covariance structure of the OLS estimator.
In general, the presence of ΣV in the inverted terms C reduces the variance of cβT under the noise
specification in equation (3). To make this point clear, consider a special case in which Σe = σ2IT (the
Gauss-Markov setting) and X is orthogonal. In this case, the approximate variance-covariance matrix forcβT is
σ2ΣZ (ΣZ +ΣV)
−2ΣZ,
that is a diagonal matrix in which the kth element is
σ2
Ã
(σZK)2
(σZK )2 + (σVK )
2
!2
.
It is clear that the approximate variance of cβT is smaller than the variance of the OLS-LS estimator,
which is σ2IK .
Since ΣZ and ΣV are functions of λ, equation (11), the approximate variance of cβT depends on cλT.
Maximizing the parameter and error entropies yields GME estimators cβT that have minimum variance.
In order to see this, note that the denominator of the approximate variance-covariance matrix contains the
terms ΣZ+ΣV, which is the sum of the variance-covariance matrices for distributions bp and bw. Thus the
maximum entropy solution corresponds with the maximum denominator for the approximate variance ofcβT, which minimizes the approximate variance of cβT.17
Finally, Golan, Judge and Miller (1997) claim that, although the finite sample GME solution is almost
certainly biased, the GME consistency constraints must be satisfied and its bias cannot become very large.
Therefore, given the properties of limited bias and minimum variance, GME solutions exhibit reduced MSE
relative to OLS estimators in finite sample settings. In particular, Monte Carlo experiments presented in
Section 6 reveal that the GME estimators exhibit a proper finite sample behavior since they show reduced
MSE relative to OLS estimators.
2.6 CoPoD: how does it diﬀer from other methodologies?
In recent years, a number of econometric approaches that try to predict episodes of financial instability in
the financial system, as a whole, have emerged in the literature. These approaches are known as "early
warning systems". Some of the best known are the "signals methodology" by Kaminsky, Lizondo and
Reinhart (1998) and multivariate probit or logit regression models à la Frankel and Rose (1996). While
17For example, for M=2, it is possible to rewrite S (?p) from equation (A.3.1) in terms of ?pk and (1−?pk). It then follows that
maximizing S (?pk) to choose the GME solutions also maximizes the σZK , the variance of the distribution on zk. Using the
same arguments with S (?w) , we get to maximize the σVK , the variance of the distribution on vk. Therefore, the maximum
entropy solution corresponds with the maximum denominator for the approximate variance of ?βT, which minimizes ?βT
approximate variance.
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the selection of the explanatory variables used in these methodologies is also based on theoretical models
of currency and banking crises, CoPoD diﬀers from these models in both the objective of measurement and
the econometric techniques applied.
With respect to the objective of measurement, it is the empirical frequencies of loan default (PoDs) by
SMEs and unlisted companies that represent the dependent variable in our study. Consequently, rather
than trying to assess the probability of episodes of financial instability in the financial system as a whole,
as the early warning systems do, the core objective behind the development of CoPoD is to improve the
measurement of the impact of key macroeconomic and financial developments on the likelihood of default
of specific types of loans within an economy.
With respect to the econometric techniques, the "signals methodology" is based on the assumption
that the economy behaves diﬀerently on the eve of financial crises and that this aberrant behavior has
a recurrent systematic pattern. Therefore, the "signals methodology" monitors a large set of indicators
(variables) that signal that a crisis is likely whenever they cross a certain threshold. The procedure used
by these models to specify significant variables is not amenable to the usual statistical tests of significance.
Moreover, the "signals methodology" requires the specification of thresholds and forces the modeler to be
quite specific about the timing of early warnings. These requirements may prove diﬃcult to fulfil, if one
wanted to apply a similar methodology to analyze the credit risk of loans, given the data restrictions that
credit risk modelers face. This methodology also imposes some restrictions (e.g. that indicators send a
signal only when they reach a threshold) that may omit valuable information.
Multivariate probit or logit regression models define the dependent variable to take the value of one, if
a period is classified as a crisis, and a value of zero if there is no crisis. When such a regression is fitted
on a pooled set of country data, the statistical significance of the estimated regression coeﬃcients reveals
which indicators are "significant" and which are not, and the predicted value of the dependent variable
should identify in which periods countries have a higher or lower probability of a crisis. Since credit
risk modelers are usually interested in identifying significant variables aﬀecting the credit risk of specific
assets (i.e., loans in this case), similar methodologies to analyze the impact of diﬀerent macroeconomic
and financial variables on the credit risk of specific types of loans have commonly been applied. In fact,
probit or logit models that use information aggregated at the loan level (as we do) and that try to model
PoDs as functions of macroeconomic and financial variables have been developed by the financial industry.
Examples developed by the private sector include Wilson (1997a,b) and Kim (1999) and by regulators Boss
(2002) and Jimenez and Saurina (2004b). However, these methodologies use OLS estimation procedures to
recover the parameters of their explanatory variables. The use of OLS estimation represents an important
limitation for these models, as often the number of observations in the sample barely exceeds the number
of parameters to be estimated. As already mentioned, under these circumstances the parameters recovered
with OLS procedures are ineﬃcient and very sensitive to small changes in the data. When implementing
CoPoD, the procedure used to select the set of explanatory variables involves the use of multivariate OLS
regressions, with the specific objective of making a final selection of the variables which, besides being
consistent with theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, provide the best fit. However, once the
set of explanatory variables has been chosen, we recover their parameters with CoPoD, improving their
eﬃciency. Thus, we can improve the measurement of the impact of diﬀerent macroeconomic and financial
developments on the credit risk of specific types of loans.
Note also that our methodology diﬀers from bank failure prediction models that try to assess the
probability of bank failures based on banks’ information at the balance sheet level. Altman et al (1981),
Looney et al (1989), Fissel et al (1996) and Kolari et al (2001) are examples of this literature. These models
rely on data referring to only one date or, at best, to a short time period and do not incorporate general
macroeconomic and financial system variables. So, they cannot measure the evolution of risk through time.
Moreover, since they look at aggregate (balance sheet level) data, they cannot identify the specific types of
assets (loans or other financial instruments) in banks’ portfolios that could increase/decrease the likelihood
of bank failures, nor can they measure the diversification eﬀects brought about by diﬀerent types of loans
(assets).
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3 Economic framework
3.1 Empirical evidence
It has been claimed that financial liberalization provides a more eﬃcient allocation of investment in both
physical and human capital by improving the eﬃciency of the banking system and easing financing con-
straints. In turn, this fosters long run economic growth.18 Leahy et al (2001) present empirical evidence
that supports this hypothesis. These findings have underpinned the financial liberalization that has been
taking place across the globe since the 1970s.
In recent years, however, both developed and developing economies have experienced recurrent and
sometimes violent boom-bust cycles in credit growth, economic activity and asset price changes (particularly
in real estate). These often ended in systemic crises of the banking sector.19 This has been shown by the
experience of Scandinavia in the early 1990’s, Japan in the 1990’s, Mexico in 1994 and East Asia in 1997-98.
Consequently, in this paper, we pose the following questions:
1. Does financial liberalization change economic structures in a way that makes banking
crises more likely?
A central finding of the large and growing literature on the causes of banking crises is that financial lib-
eralization significantly increases their probability. Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Kaminsky
and Reinhart (1999) show that financial liberalization helps to explain the occurrence of banking crises in
large samples of developing and developed countries.
2. Does a common pattern exist in the development of key macroeconomic and financial
variables that could be the product of structural economic changes provoked by financial
liberalization?
A few studies have tried to derive stylized facts for the development of macroeconomic and financial
variables in the wake of financial liberalization.20 Anecdotal evidence of boom-bust cycles in bank lending,
economic activity and asset prices after financial liberalization have been documented separately for Scan-
dinavia and East Asia by Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1998) and Collyns and Senhadji (2002) respectively. In
order to assess more broadly whether, after financial liberalization, economic structures have been altered
and whether there is a common pattern in the development of key macroeconomic and financial variables
after financial liberalization, Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2004) consider the development of real
GDP, bank lending, property prices and share prices in the wake of financial liberalization for a sample of
16 OECD countries.21
Their results, reproduced in Figure 1, reveal that financial liberalization is generally followed by a
boom-bust cycle in economic activity, bank lending and asset prices. Individual country data suggest that
all these countries experienced a cycle after financial liberalization, although with substantial variation in
the timing of its occurrence. The evidence provided by these results appears to indicate that financial
liberalization does alter economic structures and that common patterns (cycles) in key variables can be
observed.22
18See Levine (1997) for theoretical arguments.
19 See Bordo et al (2001) for an account of currency, banking and twin crises.
20Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2001) derived stylised facts for the long-run eﬀects of liberalisation for a large sample of developed
and developing countries.
21Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the UK and the US.
22On average, real GDP growth starts to rise immediately after liberalisation and peaks after about three years. Then real
growth gradually declines and falls below its initial value after about five years. Real lending growth starts to rise about one
year after the date of liberalisation and peaks after about three years. Subsequently, the growth rate of real lending declines
and falls below its initial value after about seven years. Property prices starts to rise one year after liberalisation. The
increase in property prices peaks after about three years and then gradually declines. After about six years, property prices
start to fall. Real share prices appear to be rising at a brisk pace already at the time of liberalisation. After liberalisation,
the increase in share prices further accelerates and peaks after about six quarters. About five years after liberalisation, share
prices start to fall. Thus the sample appears to support the notion that episodes of financial liberalisation are followed by
pronounced boom-bust cycles. See Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2004).
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Figure 1: Post-liberalisation Cycles
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Source: Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2004).
3. Therefore, the critical question is the following: Do fluctuations in key macroeconomic
and financial variables provide significant information about vulnerabilities in the finan-
cial system that can explicitly increase the credit risk of banks?
A robust finding that emerges from the literature on leading indicators of banking crises is that rapid
domestic credit growth increases the credit risk of banks. This has been documented by Pill and Pradhan
(1995), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Eichengreen and Areta (2000). Mishkin (1997) documents how
in Mexico, bank credit to private non-financial enterprises went from a level of around 10 percent of GDP
in the late 1980s to 40 percent of GDP in 1994. The stock market rose significantly during the early 1990s,
up until the 1994 Mexican crisis, triggered by the Colosio assassination and the uprising in the Mexican
state of Chiapas. Subsequently, the prices of stocks and other assets fell and banking and foreign exchange
crises occurred. Heiskanen (1993) documents similar events in Norway, where the ratio of bank loans to
nominal GDP went from 40 percent in 1984 to 68 percent in 1988. Similarly, Vale (2004) reports that
between December 1984 and September 1986 the Norwegian real 12-month growth in bank loans stayed
above 20%. Asset prices soared, while consumption also increased significantly. The collapse in oil prices
in late 1985, together with macroeconomic conditions which were binding during that time, triggered the
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Norwegian crisis, causing the most severe banking crisis and recession since the war.23
However, in most studies, asset price development analyses have mainly focused on equity prices, rather
than on real estate values, or they do not take account of the combination of events and the interactions
between credit, asset prices (real estate), the real economy and their implications for financial risk. Borio
and Lowe (2002) take a step forward in this direction.24 They analyze a sample of 34 developed and
middle-income developing economies and provide evidence that the combination of events, in particular
the simultaneous occurrence of rapid credit growth and rapid increases in asset prices (rather than either
one alone), appear to be common factors that augment the probability of episodes of financial instability
in the banking system.
3.2 Hypothesis
We hypothesize that financial liberalization provokes structural changes in the economy and creates incen-
tive structures that have the potential to convert fluctuations in key macroeconomic and financial variables
into endogenous events that define cycles in credit, economic activity and asset prices. These cycles, in
turn, appear to involve and indeed may amplify financial imbalances which, when unwound, can place great
stress on the financial system. This hypothesis implies that cycles in the financial system are amplified
due to the fact that at the upturn of the cycle, banks sharply increase lending as prices of assets held as
collateral increase, and the state of confidence in the system is positive. It is also during this stage that the
seeds of financial imbalances are sown and the financial vulnerability (risk) of the economy increases, as
also do levels of leverage of the banking system. As a result, when vulnerabilities in the economy are high,
sudden changes in the system’s state of confidence have the potential to interact and become endogenous,
self-fulfilling fluctuations that define (and possibly exacerbate) the downturn of the cycle. During this
stage, the previously sown risk is harvested and stress in the financial system rises. Alternative theories
(as we argue below) also indicate that incentive structures created under financial liberalization play an
important role in market participants’ willingness to take on risks and therefore in the intensity of the
cycles.
3.3 Underlying economic theory
Our hypothesis is fully consistent with theoretical models that include credit constraints and a financial
accelerator, as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kyotaki and Moore (1997). Financial liberalization
relaxes borrowing constraints faced by the private sector, and therefore has similar eﬀects to a positive,
permanent productivity shock to the economy. In models with credit-constrained borrowers, a positive
productivity shock provokes a boom-bust cycle in lending (credit growth), economic activity and asset
prices. The reasoning is that such a shock increases the value of collateralizable assets. As the borrowing
capacity of entrepreneurs depends on the value of their collateralizable assets, an appreciation in the value
of the assets increases the level of lending in the economy. This in turn fuels further economic activity
and asset price growth, which again increases borrowing capacity, and so on. This goes on until the rise
in capital stock becomes so large that profit margins crumble. Then the process reverses itself. The result
is a credit cycle à la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Thus the evolution of a simultaneous boom-bust cycle
in credit growth and asset prices in systems that have gone through the process of financial liberalization
confirms the theory.
Incentive structures created under financial liberalization appear to intensify the cycles in the macro-
economy and in the financial system through diﬀerent channels. For example, by increasing competitive
pressures among financial intermediaries, seeking to increase market share, financial liberalization has in-
creased the scope for risk taking, herd behavior and leverage. Along these lines, it has been argued that
financial liberalization appears to have strengthened the eﬀects of the financial accelerator mechanism.25
23A detailed study of the Norwegian banking crisis has been published by the Norges Bank (2004).
24Borio and Lowe (2002), building on the "signals methodology" pioneered by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1999) take
account of the combination of events, look at cumulative processes and incorporate in their study the development of prices
of real estate assets.
25 In order to test this hypothesis empirically, Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2004) performed rolling regressions for a
reduced form credit growth equation, where they regressed the change in real bank lending on its own lag, the lagged change
in property prices, the lagged change in real GDP and the lagged change in the short-term real interest rate. The rolling
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As the liberalization of banking systems has usually been accompanied by liberalizations of capital and
stock markets, it has became easier for the largest and safest borrowers from banks to raise funds on the
capital and stock market.26 Therefore, in an eﬀort to recover lost business, banks have increased lending
to SMEs, unlisted firms and individuals. Smaller size borrowers are, in general, riskier and the cost of
acquiring information on large numbers of idiosyncratic borrowers is greater, so banks have placed increas-
ing weight on collateral as a basis for lending. As a result, changes in the value of collateralizable assets,
predominantly real estate, are likely to enhance the eﬀects of the financial accelerator and therefore have
provoked more pronounced cycles.27
Allen and Gale (1998) provide an alternative theory as to how incentive structures under financial
liberalization have increased the scope for risk-taking and have exacerbated cycles in asset prices. They
argue that many investors in real state and stock markets obtain their investment funds from external
sources. If the ultimate providers of funds are unable to observe the characteristics of the investment, and
there exists limited liability for investors, a classic risk-shifting problem is caused. Risk-shifting increases
assets’ investment returns and causes investors to bid up asset prices. A crucial determinant of asset prices
is the amount of credit that is provided for speculative investment. Financial liberalization, by expanding
the volume of credit for speculative investments, can interact with the agency problem and lead to booms
in asset prices.28 Therefore delegated investment and risk management have the potential to enhance
risk-taking behavior.
Dooley (1997), on the other hand, argues that financial liberalization can exacerbate banking crises when
there is implicit insurance provided by the government. In these cases, foreign investors first acquire insured
claims on residents. When government reserves are exactly matched by its contingent insurance liabilities,
expected yield on domestic liabilities falls below world rates. Then foreign investors sell the insured assets to
the government, exhausting its reserves.29 Financial liberalization, by providing foreigners with increased
access to domestic liabilities and by increasing implicit insurance (because liberalization is often backed by
oﬃcial creditor governments or by international agencies), exacerbates this eﬀect. Therefore, to the extent
that implicit guarantees lead banks to engage in moral hazard lending, the implicit guarantees represent
a hidden government deficit that can exacerbate banking crises. This phenomenon has also been reported
in the guise of carry trades by Garber and Lall (1996).30
Self-fulfilling expectations and herding behavior in international capital markets have also been accused
of playing an important role in the intensity of the cycles by second-generation models in the currency
crisis literature. References for this literature include Obstfeld (1995), Flood and Marion (1999).31
Peer-group performance measures or index tracking can also encourage herding and short-termism
among institutional investors, with the potential to create self-fulfilling fluctuations in leverage and asset
prices. For example, a bank manager who systematically loses market share and who under-performs his
regression results clearly support the view that bank lending has become more sensitive to property price movements after
financial liberalisation.
26 See Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) for a cross-country chronology of the banking sector and stock market liberalisations.
27Recently, it has also been observed that the value of collateral assets exerts a powerful stimulus to consumption spending,
since the latter has been increasingly financed by borrowing against capital gains on homes. This has occurred in step with
rising real estate prices. Empirical experience has shown that this powerful stimulus can be drastically reduced or reversed
when house prices stop increasing, even where prices have not fallen, pushing the economy into recession. This has already
been experienced in the Netherlands. The rate of Dutch house price inflation slowed from 20% in 2000 to zero by 2003. This
appeared to be the perfect soft landing since prices did not fall. Yet consumer spending dropped by 12% in 2003, the biggest
fall in any developed country in a decade, pushing the economy into a recession. This type of eﬀect may be observed in the
future, as the levels of indebtedness against capital gains of real estate are at record levels in countries like the United States,
Britain and Australia.
28McKinnon and Pill (1996, 1997) suggest an alternative theory of financial crises. They claim that government guarantees
are the fundamental cause in crises; because the government guarantees deposits, banks are not subject to the usual discipline
of the market. This allows banks to engage in speculative investment, which bids up asset prices and creates a boom on them,
which eventually busts.
29For this reason, Dooley stresses the importance of looking at total levels of debt in the economy, versus only public debt.
30Garber and Lall (1996) estimate that Mexican banks held $16 billion worth of Tesobono (Mexican treasury bonds) swaps
at the time of the peso devaluation in 1994. Initial devaluation led to a price fall of 15%, and margin calls of $2.4 billion,
almost half of the $5 billion reserves lost by the Mexican Central Bank one day after the devaluation.
31Empirical evidence is consistent with these models. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2001) have
reported that crises are typically preceded by a multitude of weak and deteriorating economic fundamentals which have caused
speculative attacks as market sentiment shifts and, possibly, herd behaviour takes over. This is in contrast to first-generation
models that focus on poor fundamentals as the cause of the crises.
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competitors, in terms of earnings growth, increases his probability of being sacked. Thus, managers have a
strong incentive to behave in the same way as their peers, which at an aggregate level enhances boom-bust
cycles in lending (Rajan, 1994).
Pressures to meet short-term earnings targets, for instance, or incentive structures that reward staﬀ at
intermediaries according to volume of business rather than risk-adjusted return can lead to underestimation
of long term risk and imprudent leveraging. This eﬀect has been reported by Saunders et al (1990) and
Gorton and Rosen (1995).
As argued above, macroeconomic cycles appear to be intensified by diﬀerent incentive structures created
under financial liberalization. On the other hand, bank regulation, in the form of capital adequacy require-
ments, is itself inherently procyclical; it bites in downturns, but fails to provide restraint in booms. The
more “risk-sensitive” the regulation, as Basel II is intended to be,32 the greater the scope for procyclicality
to become a problem, particularly in light of the changing nature of macroeconomic cycles. Therefore,
an issue that deserves close attention is that the incentive structures created under financial liberalization
could interact with the incentive structures embedded in Basel II proposals, thus enhancing even further the
intensity of macroeconomic cycles and the procyclicality of the financial system. The simulation exercises
performed in Segoviano and Lowe (2002), Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2004) and Goodhart and
Segoviano (2004) suggest that the new Basel II accord, which deliberately aims at significantly increasing
the risk sensitiveness of capital requirements, may in fact considerably accentuate the procyclicality of
the regulatory system. The authors present evidence that suggests that, in the past, required increases of
capital ratios in downturns have been brought about by cutting back lending rather than by raising capital.
The new capital accord may therefore lead to an amplification of business cycle fluctuations, especially in
downturns.33
On the basis of the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence presented in this section, we shall define
an initial set of macroeconomic and financial variables to analyze in order to select the set of explanatory
variables to include in our model. This is because we believe that key macroeconomic and financial
variables exhibit regularities when macroeconomic imbalances are being created and when vulnerabilities
in the financial system are increasing. Thus information on systemic vulnerabilities should be attainable
from the analysis of these variables.
4 Procedure to select the explanatory variables
In this section, we propose a procedure for selecting the set of explanatory variables used for the imple-
mentation of CoPoD. This involves two steps. In the first step, we select an initial set of macroeconomic
and financial variables that, according to theory and empirical evidence, aﬀect credit risk. In the second
step, we explore the variables’ information content by computing their fluctuations both with respect to
a long-term trend, and with respect to the previous series observation. We call the first “gaps” and the
latter “growth rates”.34 Having obtained the gaps and growth rates, we run multivariate OLS regressions
to identify the specifications that are consistent with economic theory and empirical evidence and that
show the best goodness of fit.
This exercise should be seen as a procedure to identify alternative specifications (containing relevant
variables) that aﬀect the credit risk of specific types of loans in the countries under analysis. By no means
do we want our results to be interpreted as an attempt to define a fixed specification (set of explanatory
variables) that explains credit risk in the financial systems of the countries under analysis.35 In this section,
we also describe the dependent variable under study.
32See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (2002).
33Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2004) analyze the “credit crunch” experience in the USA recession of 1990/91, when
required bank capital adequacy ratios were being raised in the aftermath of the first Basel Accord in 1988.
34 See section 4.3.1 for definitions of gaps and growth rates.
35This distinction is important, since the default frequency of loans classified under diﬀerent risk rating-categories (ratings)
can be aﬀected by diﬀerent macroeconomic and financial variables, even if the borrowers to whom these loans are granted
operate in the same country. Moreover, even if loans classified under diﬀerent ratings were aﬀected by the same macroeconomic
and/or financial variables, the degree of the impact of these variables (coeﬃcients) might be diﬀerent between loans with
diﬀerent ratings.
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4.1 The initial set of macroeconomic and financial variables
In order to select the explanatory variables to include in our model, we initially analyzed a set of macroeco-
nomic and financial variables that have been emphasized in the theoretical and empirical literature about
crisis periods, and that are available for Norway and Mexico.
Based on the arguments presented in the previous section, variables associated with financial liberal-
ization merit scrutiny. Real aggregate credit in the economy, the ratio of credit to GDP, M2 balances, real
interest rates and the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves were considered. Pill and Pradhan (1995),
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Eichengreen and Areta (2000) and Borio and Lowe (2002) have re-
ported that real aggregate credit in the economy and the ratio of credit to GDP are important indicators of
banking problems. McKinnon and Pill (1996) have reported rapid increases in monetary aggregates linked
to banking crises. Galbis (1993) reports that real interest rates have increased after financial liberalization.
The ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves captures the extent to which the liabilities of the banking
system are backed by international reserves. In the event of a currency crisis, individuals may rush to
convert their domestic currency deposits into foreign currency, so this ratio seems to capture the ability of
the central bank to meet those demands (Calvo and Mendoza, 1996). Currency crises may take place after
a period of large inflows of foreign short-term capital. Such inflows, usually driven by the combined eﬀect
of capital account liberalization and high domestic interest rates, result in an expansion of domestic credit
(Khamis, 1996). When foreign interest rates rise, domestic ones fall, or when confidence in the economy
shifts, foreign investors quickly withdraw their funds and the domestic banking system may become illiquid
(Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart, 1993).
We included the current account balance since this variable indicates the amount of foreign investment
needed in the economy and is therefore a variable that could signal the vulnerability of the economy to
shifts in investors’ confidence. Consumption and investment were also included since these variables can
indicate the uses of funding in the economy and therefore can shape the expectations of investors in terms
of the capacity of the economy to produce growth opportunities in the future. Foreign Direct Investment
was also included as a measure of the vulnerability of the economy to foreign capital. (Sturm, Berger and
Haan 2004).36 To capture adverse macroeconomic shocks that hurt banks by increasing the share of non-
performing loans, we considered changes in real GDP. An index of equity prices, an index of residential
property prices and an aggregate asset price index37 were also included and justified by the findings of
Borio and Lowe (2002) and Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2004), as discussed in Section 3.38
The realized volatility of short-term interest rates was considered since this variable aﬀects banks’
balance sheets adversely if shifts in interest rates force banks to increase the interest rates paid to depositors.
If the asset side of the balance sheets of banks consists of long-term loans at fixed interest rates, the rate
of return on assets cannot be adjusted quickly enough and banks will suﬀer reduced profits or bear losses.
Volatility in interest rates is likely to hurt bank balance sheets, even if it can be passed on to borrowers, as
volatile rates and uncertainty aﬀect cash-flow planning and high lending rates result in a larger fraction of
non-performing loans (Mishkin, 1997).39 The diﬀerence between long and short nominal rates was included
as a variable that indicates market expectations on growth in the economy.
Another case of rate of return mismatch occurs when banks borrow in a foreign currency and lend in
a domestic currency. In this case, an unexpected depreciation of the domestic currency threatens bank
profitability and eventually, solvency. Banks that raise funds abroad might choose to issue domestic loans
denominated in foreign currency, thus eliminating currency mismatches. In this case, foreign exchange risk
is shifted onto borrowers, and an unexpected depreciation would still aﬀect bank profitability negatively
through an increase in non-performing loans. We have therefore included the nominal foreign exchange
36Sturm, Berger and Haan (2004) find that the ratio of investment to GDP is robustly related to the probability that a
country receives IMF credit. A low ratio of investment to GDP may indicate limited access to international capital markets.
Knight and Santaella (1997), Vreeland (1999) also provide support for this view.
37The aggregate asset price index combines prices of three asset classes, equity, residential property and commercial property.
It weights the components by estimates of the shares of the asset classes in private sector wealth. The methodology is described
in detailed in Borio et al (1994). We thank Borio and Lowe for providing us with the aggregate asset price index series.
38Note that, as already mentioned in Section 3, an alternative explanation of the causes and eﬀects of increases in asset
prices is provided by the literature on the agency problem of excessive risk-taking associated with limited liability. See Allen
and Gale (1999).
39 See also the Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, September 2003 for empirical evidence between Financial Market
Volatility and Financial System Instability.
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rate. Foreign currency loans were a source of banking problems in the Nordic countries in the early 1990’s
(Drees and Pazarbasioglu, 1998) and in Mexico (Mishkin, 1997). A real foreign exchange rate index was
also included.40 A summary of the variables that were analyzed, the code that we used to identify them
and their source is in Table 1.41
Table 1: Initial set of macroeconomic and financial variables
Code Variable
REPROPRI Residential Property Prices*
INCOCD Real Estate Price Index*
EQPRI Equity Price Index**
SHAPRI Share Price Index**
AGGPRI Aggregate Asset Price Index*
NEER Nominal Fx**
M2 M2 Monetary Aggregate**
REER Real Fx**
RESER International Reserves**
REINT Real Interest Rates**
SHORTINT Short Interest Rates**
LONGINT Long Interest Rates**
GDPREAL Real GDP**
CRED Real Credit Aggregate**
CONS Real Consumption Aggregate**
CA Current Account Balance**
FDI Foreign Direct Investment**
INV Real Investment Aggregate**
CREDOVGDP Ratio of Credit to GDP***
INVOVGDP Ratio of Investment to GDP***
CONOVGDP Ratio of Consumption to GDP***
CUACCOVINV Ratio of Current Account to Investment***
M2OVRES Ratio of M2 to International Reserves***
LOMISH Long minus Short Interest Rates***
INREVO1 Realized Volatility of Interest Rates***
*National Sources as per detailed documentation and BIS calculations based on na-
tional data.
**IMF international financial statistics.
***Author’s calculations based on national data.
4.2 The dependent variables
The empirical frequencies of loan default (PoDs) by SMEs and unlisted firms are the dependent variables
under study. The motivation for developing CoPoD is to improve the measurement of the impact of
macroeconomic developments on loans’ credit risk, and, as a result, to improve the measurement of loans’
credit risk through time. This is in contrast to the attempt to assess the probability of episodes of financial
instability in the financial system as a whole, as the early warning systems do. Note that since the likelihood
of default of specific types of loans is aﬀected by the state of the business cycle, we select a set of explanatory
40An increase in the real exchange rate index implies depreciation.
41Of course, this is not an exhaustive list of potential variables. In particular political variables can also be linked to
the timing of the crises. Variables capturing the eﬀectiveness of the legal system have also been found to be significant in
explaining banking sector problems. Variables reflecting exogenous events can also explain specific crises. None of these are
considered. For the eﬀect of political variables see Mishra (1997). For the eﬀect of legal structures see Arkelof and Romer
(1993).
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variables that aﬀect the credit risk of these types of loans, on the basis of theoretical arguments behind
crisis models.
In our dataset, loans given to SMEs and unlisted firms are classified and aggregated according to their
risk-rating categories. For a given risk-rating category, the empirical frequencies of loan defaults that are
recorded during each period of time are accommodated in a vector. Therefore, each element of this vector
reflects the average default behavior of borrowers classified under a given risk-rating category at diﬀerent
points in time.
These databases were provided by Norges Bank and by Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores
(CNBV).42 In Norway, risk-rating classification is done using Norges Bank’s risk rating model.43 Banks
operating in Mexico, based on a rating system set out by the regulatory authority, determine ratings
internally and then report them to CNBV.44 For Norway we have yearly observations from 1988 to 2001.
For Mexico, we have quarterly observations from the second quarter of 1995 to the last quarter of 2000.
Classification and aggregation of loans can be done according to other loan characteristics, such as
sectoral activity of borrowers, geographical location of borrowers, type of collateral backing up the loan
etc. Unfortunately, we do not have such information. This restriction in aggregation involves a trade oﬀ.
On the down side, under the risk-rating category aggregation, the number of observations in the time series
of PoDs is usually very small. This type of aggregation does not allow us to explore the behavior of credit
risk from diﬀerent perspectives, e.g. the default behavior of borrowers according to their sectoral activity
or type of collateral. Yet, despite these shortcomings, the dataset is one of few that, by aggregating via
risk-rating category, allows us to study the impact of macroeconomic cycles on banks’ capital requirements.
Moreover, the data cover an entire business cycle in both of the analyzed countries and focuses on SMEs
and unlisted borrowers. These characteristics allow us to explore a number of important issues.
4.3 Guideline for refinement in the selection of explanatory variables
4.3.1 Statistical treatment of variables
Our aim here is to analyze combinations of fluctuations in diﬀerent macroeconomic and financial variables
as possible causes of changes in credit risk. When we compute fluctuations in these variables, they are
calculated using only information that would have been available to the analyst up to the time when the
analysis was done.45
These fluctuations are computed with respect to two types of “reference values”: a long-term trend and
the previous observation. When computing movements with respect to a long-term trend, we are interested
in capturing the explanatory power of cumulative processes, rather than growth rates over just one period.
The reasoning behind this approach is that vulnerabilities may build up over an extended period, rather
than in a single period. We refer to these movements with respect to long-term trends as “gaps”. In order
to estimate the long-term trend, we use a “Dynamic” Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter using information from
1970. For a detailed description of this procedure, please refer to Appendix A.5.
Some criticism might be made of the way that any filter weighs the data. Taking this into consideration,
we also computed and tested the explanatory power of fluctuations with respect to the previous observation.
We refer to these as “growth rates”.
Both types of reference values represent diﬀerent ways of using the information available to the model
builder. We do not consider such values as “fundamental values”. This distinction highlights a key issue,
especially in the case of price variables, since we do not try to identify asset price bubbles. An asset price
bubble can be characterized by a significant over-pricing of an asset from its “fundamental value”. There
is no attempt in this paper to assess “fundamental values” and measure price deviations from them. For
the purposes of this exercise, the more relevant issue is to assess the combination of events that has the
potential to increase banks’ credit risk. Consequently, we would like to steer the discussion away from the
market eﬃciency debate.
42The Central Bank of Norway and the Mexican Financial Regulatory Agency, respectively.
43For details of this model, refer to Bernhardsen (2001) and Eklund et al (2001).
44The Mexican rating methodology is described in: http://www.cnbv.gob.mx
45We refer to this set of information as “ex-ante” information.
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4.3.2 Multivariate OLS regressions for selection of variables
Using equation (2), we run multivariate OLS regressions, exploring diﬀerent combinations of variable “gaps”
and variable “growth rates” with diﬀerent lags.46 For Norway, we used up to 8 lags, since the frequency
of the data was annual, whereas for Mexico we used up to 30 lags, since the frequency of the data was
quarterly.47 Each lag was treated as a diﬀerent explanatory variable.
Since the time series of the dependent variables contain very few observations, we tried to be as parsi-
monious as possible. As a result, we started specifying regression systems with the fewest possible variables
and explored how far these could take us. We continued increasing the set of explanatory variables used
in the specifications, keeping in mind the trade oﬀ with degrees of freedom when increasing regressors.
Therefore, we restricted specifications to contain 2 and 4 explanatory variables for Norway and 3 and 6
explanatory variables for Mexico.48
Once we defined the number of explanatory variables to be included in each specification, we computed
OLS multivariate regressions for all the possible combinations with the defined number of explanatory
variables for each specification.
4.4 Selected explanatory variables
Model specifications were selected based on the consistency of the explanatory variables with theoretical
arguments and empirical evidence and on the specifications’ goodness of fit, indicated by the Adjusted
R-squared and Akaike criteria. Specifications that were inconsistent with theoretical arguments were ruled
out. Under these criteria, Table 2 and Table 3 show the selected specifications for Norway and Mexico
respectively, using gaps and under three diﬀerent specifications.
Results for Norway:
Table 2: OLS results for Norway: gaps
OLS results for Norway: gaps
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value
Constant 3.664095 0.0000 3.649223 0.0000 3.637719 0.0000
GapCREDOVGDP(-4) 0.554376 0.0059 0.547557 0.0012 0.287520 0.0050
GapAGGPRINDX(-3) 0.208837 0.0225 0.264793 0.0014
INREVO1(-1) 812.556400 0.0195 923.145100 0.0000
LOMISH(-2) 0.009309 0.1000
GapAGGPRINDX(-1) -0.584903 0.0000
GapM2OVRES 0.292388 0.0000
R-squared 0.6683 0.7874 0.9465
Adjusted R-squared 0.6080 0.6929 0.9227
Akaike criterion -3.7125 -3.8718 -5.2510
Schwarz criterion -3.5756 -3.6436 -5.0228
F-statistic 11.0798 8.3345 39.7886
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0023 0.0043 0.0000
Dependent Variable: aNor. Method: OLS. Sample: 1988-2001. Included observations: 14.
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=2).
Specification 1, contains the results for Norway, with two explanatory variables. These are the
gap in the ratio of credit to GDP (GapCREDOVGDP) and the gap in the aggregate asset price index
46See Section 7 for further explanation of lags.
47We assumed that longer lags were not consistent with economic theory.
48The reason was that, for Norway, the number of observations (14) is smaller than for Mexico (23).
22
(GapAGGPRINDX). These variables are lagged four and three periods respectively. As we can see, the
parameter estimates of these variables are statistically highly significant, with p-values of just over .59%
and 2.2%. Given that we are only using two explanatory variables, the goodness of fit (as indicated by the
adjusted R-squared) is quite high. As we will argue in Section 7, the sign of the coeﬃcients and the timing
of the lags are consistent with theoretical arguments and empirical evidence.
In Specification 2, we present results augmenting the number of explanatory variables to include the
interest rate volatility (INREVO1) and the diﬀerence between long-term minus short-term interest rates
(LOMISH). These variables are lagged one year and two years, respectively, and their parameters are
significant at the 1.9% and 10% significance level. In this specification, the goodness of fit improves, as
indicated by the lower Akaike criterion and higher adjusted R-squared. Parameter estimates of the gap in
credit to GDP and the gap in the aggregate asset price index remain statistically significant at the same
lags as in the previous specification, and are consistent with empirical evidence.
In Specification 3, the results for the parameters of GapCREDOVGDP and INREVO1 are similar
to the results reported in Specification 2. However, when we explore the explanatory power of the gap in
the aggregate asset price index (GapAGGPRINDX) lagged only one year, this variable had a negative and
highly significant parameter (with an extremely small p-value). As we will argue in Section 7, this result is
consistent with our hypothesis. We also explore the explanatory power of the gap in the ratio of M2 over
international reserves. This variable has a highly significant parameter. In this specification, the goodness
of fit improves even further, as indicated by an even lower Akaike criterion and higher adjusted R-squared.
Results for Mexico:
Table 3: OLS results for Mexico: gaps
OLS results for Mexico: gaps
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value
Constant 2.840080 0.0000 2.641826 0.0000 2.510054 0.0000
GapCREDOVGDP(-24) 3.632902 0.0014 4.879514 0.0000 3.066573 0.0117
GapINCOCDRE(-20) 14.548380 0.0000 6.154473 0.0070
GapSHAPRIRE(-15) 1.901396 0.0006
GapSHAPRIRE(-16) 1.053357 0.0001
INREVO1(-10) 648.5374 0.0444 1204.7040 0.0194
GapM2OVRES(-6) 0.521614 0.0024 0.656527 0.0045
GapINVOVGDP(-8) -6.206859 0.0000 -6.355086 0.0001
GapINCOCDRE(-11) -7.124320 0.0119
R-squared 0.6311 0.9281 0.8751
Adjusted R-squared 0.5728 0.9012 0.8383
Akaike criterion 1.2061 -0.1687 0.2974
Schwarz criterion 1.4036 0.1769 0.5936
F-statistic 10.8345 34.4375 23.8110
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000
Dependent Variable: aMex, Method: OLS. Sample: 1995:2 2000:4. Included observations: 23.
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=2).
We performed a similar exercise with the Mexican dataset. In this case, there was no information of
an aggregate asset price index, as in the case of Norway. Therefore, instead, we used a series of real estate
prices (INCOCDRE) and a series of stock prices (SHAPRIRE). On the other hand, the time series for
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Mexico contained more observations since its frequency was quarterly. Results for Mexico for the three
selected specifications using gaps are presented in Table 4.3. These are as follows:
Specification 1, contains the results for Mexico with three explanatory variables. These are the gap in
the ratio of credit to GDP (GapCREDOVGDP), the gap in the real estate price index (GapINCOCDRE)
and the gap of the real share price (GapSHAPRIRE). These variables are lagged twenty-four, twenty and
fifteen periods, respectively. As can be seen, the parameters of these variables are statistically highly
significant with p-values of less than 1%. Given that we are only using three explanatory variables, the
goodness of fit is quite high. As we will argue in Section 7, the sign of the coeﬃcients and the timing of
the lags are consistent with theoretical arguments and empirical evidence.
In Specification 2, we increase the number of explanatory variables and include the interest rate
volatility (INREVO1), the gap of the ratio of M2 over reserves (GapHCDM2OVRES) and the gap of the
ratio of investment over GDP (GapINVOVGDP). These variables are lagged ten, six and eight periods (in
this case, quarters), respectively. Under this specification, the goodness of fit improves, as is indicated by
the lower Akaike criterion and higher adjusted R-squared. The coeﬃcients of the gaps in the credit to
GDP, the real estate price index and real share price remain highly statistically significant with p-values
of less than 1% and at similar lags as in the previous specification. The coeﬃcients of the interest rate
volatility, the gap of the ratio of M2 over reserves and the gap of investment over GDP are all consistent
with theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, as we will argue in Section 7, and are statistically highly
significant.
In Specification 3, results for the parameters of GapCREDOVGDP, INREVO1, GapM2OVRES and
GapINVOVGDP are similar to the results reported in Specification 2. However, when we explore the
explanatory power of the gap of the aggregate real estate price index (GapINCOCDRE) lagged eleven
periods, this variable had a negative and highly significant coeﬃcient. This result is consistent with our
hypothesis, as we will argue in Section 7.
Results with growth rates
We performed similar exercises with growth rates. These results are presented in Appendix A.6, where
Table 9 and Table 10 show the results for Norway and Mexico respectively. The explanatory variables
that we present in these specifications were very similar to those in the specifications with gaps and, in
general, although not in all cases, they were statistically significant. The goodness of fit for each regression
equation was adequate (although lower than in the exercise with gaps).
Nonetheless, we propose the use of gaps rather than growth rates because, as already mentioned, when
using gaps we are interested in capturing the explanatory power of cumulative processes, rather than growth
rates over just one period. In addition, after obtaining the results with growth rates, two issues made them
less useful. First, lags in the explanatory variables were generally longer (therefore, for some variables, the
timing of the signals is no longer consistent with empirical evidence). Second, when we tested diﬀerent
lags in the explanatory variables, their coeﬃcients became highly unstable.
Final remarks
Up to now, our attention has focused on selecting the set of explanatory variables to include in the
model. For this purpose, we have used multivariate OLS regressions. However, as can be observed, the
time series of PoDs for both Norway and Mexico are very small in statistical terms. This is a problem
that is commonly faced by credit risk modelers, since usually data series are very restricted. Under these
circumstances, it is well known that, if OLS estimation procedures are used, one is likely to encounter the
following consequences:49
1. Although (Best Linear Unbiased Estimators) BLUE, the OLS estimators have large variances, making
precise estimation diﬃcult.
49 See Gujarati (1995).
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2. Because of the large variances mentioned above, the confidence intervals tend to be much wider,
leading to the acceptance of the “zero null hypothesis” (e.g., the true population coeﬃcient is zero) more
readily. Equivalently, the t-ratio of one or more coeﬃcients tends to be statistically insignificant.
3. Although the t-ratio of one or more coeﬃcients is statistically insignificant, the overall measure of
goodness of fit can be very high.
4. The OLS estimators and their standard errors can be sensitive to small changes in the data.
The second point implies that the sample data may be compatible with a diverse set of hypotheses.
Hence, the probability of accepting a false hypothesis (type II error) increases. However, the coeﬃcients
corresponding to the set of explanatory variables that were selected in each specification, despite the possible
increases in type II errors, were highly significant. Moreover, these coeﬃcients had signs consistent with
theoretical considerations. These facts give us some assurance with respect to the selected variables in
each specification. However, large variances and high sensitivity of OLS estimators represent important
problems for risk managers who try to evaluate the impact of specific macroeconomic and financial events
on the credit risk of their portfolios. In order to diminish the negative eﬀects of these problems, we propose
to recover the parameters of the selected explanatory variables with CoPoD. This is the objective of the
following section.
5 CoPoD: empirical implementation
In this section, we describe the procedure to implement CoPoD and present the results that were obtained.
5.1 Implementation procedure
Once we selected the set of explanatory variables to be used for Norway and Mexico, which are indicated
in Tables 2 and 3 respectively, we were in a position to define the X (T x K) matrices of explanatory
variables to be used in each specification.
Recall that in Section 2, when we specified equation (3), each βk was treated as a discrete random
variable with 2 ≤M <∞ possible outcomes, zk1, ..., zkM . Also, we expressed βk as a convex combination
of points zk with weights pk, (we restricted the weights to be strictly positive and to sum to 1 for each k).
The restrictions imposed on the parameter space through Z reflect prior knowledge about the unknown
parameters. However, such knowledge is not always available, and a variety of possible bounds on β may
be explored.
Golan Judge and Miller (1997) propose the use of wide bounds, if knowledge is minimal and one wants
to ensure that Z contains β. Lastly, those authors recommend to useM = 5 and J = 5. Based on diﬀerent
sampling experiments, they report that it appears that the greatest improvement in precision comes from
using M = 5 and J = 5 for each βk and et respectively.
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Taking in consideration Golan Judge and Miller (1997) findings, in order to obtain the CoPoD estima-
tors, we undertook the following steps:
1. For each specification, with the sample at hand, we estimated the vector of coeﬃcients βOLS .
2. We assumed the values of βOLS to be the ”true parameter values” and performed a bootstrap
(Horowitz, 2001) with 10,000 trials to simulate the distributions of βOLS .
3. Once that we obtained these distributions, we calculated the standard errors, σ, for each coeﬃcient,
and used these standard errors to define the bounds of Z, using a three-sigma rule.51
50The authors measure the precision of each estimator under the squared error loss, SEL =
???β−?β
???
2
. They take the average
SEL (MSEL) as an estimate of the empirical precision risk for each competing method of information recovery. Accordingly,
they compute the precision risk as the average sum of squared errors, SSE = ky −XBk2.
51Chebychev’s inequality may be used as a conservative means of specifying bounds. For any random variable, x, such that
E(x) = 0 and V ar(x) = σ2, the inequality provides Pr [|x| < vσ] ≥ v−2 for arbitrary v > 0. An example is the familiar 3σ
rule that excludes at most one-ninth of the mass for v = 3. For a recent discussion of probability bounds and the 3σ rule,
refer to Pukelsheim (1994).
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4. Then, each βk was expressed as the convex combination:
βk = zk1pk1 + zk2pk2 + zk3pk3 + zk4pk4 + zk5pk5. (23)
5. Since the bounds were defined with respect to the three-sigma rule we set zk1 = −3σ and zk5 = 3σ.
Equivalently, the point zk3 was set equal to the mean βOLS and the points zk2 and zk4 were set
equidistant between the mean and the bounds, e.g. zk2 = zk1+zk32 and zk4 =
zk3+zk5
2 .
Accordingly, in the same manner, we treated each error term et as a finite and discrete random variable
with 2 ≤ J < ∞, possible outcomes, vt1 and vtJ . We also expressed each et as a convex combination of
points vt with weights wt. As before, we restricted the weights to be strictly positive and to sum to 1 for
each t. Given our ignorance regarding the error distribution, in order to determine the error bounds of V,
we followed Golan Judge and Miller (1997) who propose calculation of the sample scale parameter and use
this with the three-sigma rule.
5.2 Recovered coeﬃcients
With the elements presented in the previous section, we were in a position to reformulate equation (2)
as indicated in equation (3). Once we reformulated the problem, we proceeded to recover the probability
vectors p and w using the Lagrangian specified in equation (7). With the recovered probability vectors, we
formed point estimates of the unknown parameter vector bβ as indicated in equation (10). The recovered
coeﬃcients for the selected explanatory variables for Norway and Mexico, using gaps under the diﬀerent
specifications, are presented in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4: CoPoD (GME) results for Norway: gaps
CoPoD (GME) results for Norway: gaps
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
Constant 3.664919 3.648975 3.637959
GapCREDOVGDP(-4) 0.558448 0.546334 0.290302
GapAGGPRINDX(-3) 0.204428 0.263379
INREVO1(-1) 826.461660 916.893640
LOMISH(-2) 0.009365
GapAGGPRINDX(-1) -0.579636
GapM2OVRES 0.290901
Dependent Variable: aNor. Method: CoPoD. Sample: 1988-2001. Included observations: 14.
Note that when we used CoPoD to recover the coeﬃcients of the chosen variables for each specification,
the signs of these coeﬃcients remained consistent with the results reported in Section 4.4. These results
are consistent with theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, as will be discussed in Section 7.
In a similar exercise, we recovered the coeﬃcients of the selected explanatory variables, using growth
rates. The results are provided in Appendix A.6, where Tables 11 and 12 show the results for Norway and
Mexico, respectively.
The finite sample properties presented in Section 2.5 indicate that the coeﬃcients recovered with CoPoD
should have smaller variances than the OLS coeﬃcients. In the following section, we quantify the eﬃciency
gain of CoPoD estimators.
6 Monte Carlo experiment
Based on the theoretical results presented in Section 2.5, Golan, Judge and Miller (1997) claim that in
finite sample settings, the GME (i.e. CoPoD estimators) exhibit reduced mean squared error (MSE) due
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Table 5: CoPoD (GME) results for Mexico: gaps
CoPoD (GME) results for Mexico: gaps
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
Constant 2.858823 2.639446 2.508866
GapCREDOVGDP(-24) 3.952335 4.883196 2.944946
GapINCOCDRE(-20) 15.849527 6.122219
GapSHAPRIRE(-15) 1.970538
GapSHAPRIRE(-16) 1.047109
INREVO1(-10) 642.310330 1228.236600
GapM2OVRES(-6) 0.525521 0.636409
GapINVOVGDP(-8) -6.247341 -6.255630
GapINCOCDRE(-11) -7.422670
Dependent Variable: aMex, Method: CoPoD. Sample: 1995:2 2000:4. Included observations: 23.
to their properties of limited bias and minimum variance. Although the exact finite-sample properties of
the CoPoD and OLS estimators are unknown, the simulated distribution of the recovered parameters may
provide some useful information. For this reason, in order to quantify the relative performance CoPoD
estimators, we performed a Monte Carlo exercise by which we simulated the distributions of the OLS and
CoPoD estimators. Then, we compared these distributions under the Mean Squared Error (MSE) criterion.
In order to perform the Monte Carlo exercise, we chose specification 1 for Norway. When we carried
out this exercise, we went through the following steps:
1. From the chosen specification, we used the matrix of explanatory variables, X (T x K), and the
vector of observations a (T x 1) to compute the vector of coeﬃcients βOLS .
2. With the matrix X (T x K), the vector of observations a (T x 1) and assuming the values of βOLS
to be the "true parameter values", we obtained the vector of residuals as: R = a−XβOLS 0.
3. With these elements we performed a Bootstrap (Horowitz, 2001), drawing 10,000 random trials.
Each trial consisted on drawing random realizations from the matrix X and the vector R. With
these elements and the βOLS that were considered to be the “true parameter values”, we computed
simulated values of a. With the simulated values of a and the random realizations of X, we recovered
the OLS estimators, βˆOLS and CoPoD estimators, βˆCoPoD. We repeated this process 10,000 times
to build the distributions of βˆOLS and βˆCoPoD.
4. With these distributions, we proceeded to compute the MSE for each parameter βOLS and βCoPoD
as
MSE
hbβi = E ∙³bβ − β´2¸ .
Results of the Monte Carlo experiment
In Table 6, we present in the first line, the vector β, containing the assumed "true parameter values"52 .
For each of the distributions of the recovered CoPoD and OLS parameters, we present from the second to
the sixth lines, their Mean, their Bias, their Bias-Squared, their Variance and MSE respectively.
In order to simplify the analysis, we present in Table 7 a summary of the results.
52Note that the values in this vector are equal to the values of βOLS reported in Table 2, Specification 1.
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Table 6: MSE components for OLS and CoPoD estimators
Component β1OLS β2OLS β3OLS β1CoPoD β2CoPoD β3CoPoD
Assumed β 3.664095 0.554376 0.208837 3.664095 0.554376 0.208837
Mean Estimated 3.665974 0.568877 0.200651 3.666028 0.567699 0.194892
Bias 0.001879 0.014501 -0.008186 0.001933 0.013323 -0.013945
Bias-Squared 0.000004 0.000210 0.000067 0.000004 0.000177 0.000194
Variance 0.000086 0.036383 0.009252 0.000032 0.024066 0.004830
MSE 0.000089 0.036593 0.009319 0.000035 0.024243 0.005024
The first line shows the diﬀerence between the Bias-Squared of the distributions of bβOLS and the
distributions of bβCoPoD.
The second line presents the diﬀerence between the Variance of the distributions of bβOLS and the
distributions of bβCoPoD.
Equally, the third line shows the diﬀerence between MSE of the distributions of bβOLS and the distrib-
utions of bβCoPoD.
A positive number indicates that the MSE component corresponding to the distribution of bβOLS is
greater than the MSE component corresponding to the distribution bβCoPoD.
Equivalently, the fourth, fifth and sixth lines illustrate the diﬀerences shown in lines one to three as a
percentage of the MSE of the respective CoPoD parameter distribution, i.e.
Bias-Squared Diﬀerence (Percentage) =
Bias-Squared bβOLS − Bias-Squared bβCoPoD
MSE bβCoPoD
Variance Diﬀerence (Percentage) =
Variance bβOLS −Variance bβCoPoD
MSE bβCoPoD
and MSE Diﬀerence (Percentage) =
MSE bβOLS −MSE bβCoPoD
MSE bβCoPoD .
Table 7: Summary statistics: MSE results
Summary Statistics β1 β2 β3
Bias-Squared Diﬀerence 0.000000 0.000033 -0.000127
Variance Diﬀerence 0.000054 0.012317 0.004423
MSE Diﬀerence 0.000054 0.012350 0.004295
Bias-Squared Diﬀerence (Percentage) -0.583168% 0.135217% -2.536907%
Variance Diﬀerence (Percentage) 152.220232% 50.806308% 88.029769%
MSE Diﬀerence (Percentage) 151.637064% 50.941525% 85.492862%
From the results, presented in Tables 6 and 7, it is possible to observe the following:
1. The Bias Squared for distributions of bβ1CoPoD and bβ2CoPoD are marginally bigger than for the
distributions of bβ1OLS and bβ2OLS respectively.
2. In Table 6, it can be observed that the distributions of bβCoPoD always show smaller variances
than the distributions of bβOLS . This can also be seen in the positive diﬀerence and the percentage
diﬀerence shown in Table 7.
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3. The reduction in variance of the distributions of bβCoPoD is relatively large in comparison to the
increase in bias of these distributions. Therefore, overall, the MSE for the distributions of bβCoPoD
is smaller than for the distributions of bβOLS.in all the cases.
The results of this Monte Carlo exercise are consistent with the finite sample properties derived by
Golan, Judge and Miller (1997) presented in Section 3.5, which indicate: First, although the GME
solution is almost certainly biased, the consistency constraints must be satisfied and the bias cannot
become very large. Second, given the properties of limited bias and reduced variance, GME solutions
exhibit reduced mean squared error (MSE) relative to OLS estimators in finite sample settings.
7 Analysis of the results
Before we analyze our results, it may be useful to define the concept of “crisis inside lag” and summarize
the empirical evidence provided by previous studies.
7.1 Crisis inside lag
Consider the behavior of the “default cycle” with respect to the outbreak of the crises.
Vale (2004) reports that the first Norwegian failure after the 1930s occurred in the autumn of 1988. In
the years 1988 to 1990, 13 banks failed. However, on account of the small size of these banks, the situation
facing the banking sector did not yet constitute a systemic crisis. With two exceptions, this first cycle
of bank problems was solved by merging the failed bank with a larger, solvent bank. Nonetheless, the
situation took on systemic dimensions by 1990, when the largest banks’ portfolios deteriorated. The scale
of defaults reached a peak in 1992. Loan losses started to decrease in 1993. This eﬀect is consistent with
the time series of the empirical default frequencies (PoDs) that we analyzed for Norway.
In Mexico, a currency crisis occurred in December 1994. However, the time series of PoDs reveal that
Mexico experienced the highest number of empirical defaults in the quarter ending September 1996.
From this information, we can define the crisis “inside lag” for Norway as the time that elapsed from
the outbreak of the “systemic crisis” to the time that defaults reached their highest frequency in 1992 (two
years). Equally, for Mexico, we can define the crisis “inside lag” as the time from the outbreak of the
“currency crisis” to the time that defaults reached their highest frequency in September 1996 (one year
and nine months).
These findings are in line with Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999)53 who find that the peak of the banking
crisis most often comes after the currency crash,54 suggesting that existing problems in the financial sector
were aggravated or new ones created by the high interest rates that were required to defend the exchange
rate peg or by the foreign exchange exposure of banks after a currency collapse. These adverse feedback
mechanisms are in line with those suggested by Mishkin (1997) and can be amplified by banks’ inadequate
hedging of foreign exchange risk, as the Asian crisis indicated, or via the financial accelerator mechanism
in the presence of the collapsing value of collateral, as discussed in Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano
(2004).
It takes time for these adverse feedback mechanisms to feed through the economy and to be reflected
in non-performing loans, i.e. a company is not likely to default at the onset of a crisis. So, once financial
problems begin, it takes time before a company finally defaults. More recently, independent research results
by Jimenez and Saurina (2004a) report similar “inside lags” for the “default cycle” in Spain.
PoDs might also include informational “noise” components. For example, banks’ desire to hide their
problems due to their reputation or to regulatory constraints (capitalization requirements) might delay the
registry of defaults. Governments might also have political or economic incentives to delay the registration
of defaults. In fact, this might have been a factor that could have influenced the “inside lag” in Mexico.55
Additionally, the information used in this study is information reported to the central bank and the financial
53Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) analyse 76 currency crises and 26 banking crises, in 20 countries (developed and developing)
for the period from 1970 to the mid 1990’s.
54Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) use as the measure of severity of the crisis, the bailout cost as a percentage of GDP.
55See: “Programa de Capitalizacion y Compra de Cartera (PCCC)” at: www.ipab.org.mx
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regulator at the “loan level”, aggregated by “risk rating class”. This degree of aggregation does not allow
us to identify specific patterns that might be contained in “inside lags”. For example, the economic activity
of borrowers that defaulted earlier/later, after the crisis, the type of loans and collateral that they had,
or even, as a result of political/economic reasons, whether there was any sector(s) that received benefits
from the authorities or was allowed to delay default. Despite the limitation of the data, and the diﬀerences
between the economies of both countries, it is interesting that the two inside lags were quite similar in both
countries.
7.2 Empirical evidence for the timing of the explanatory variables
With respect to the empirical evidence for the timing of the signals, Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache
(1998) find that variables that contribute to systemic banking sector fragility may be in place (signalling)
for two years (on average), before problems become manifest.56 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Goldstein,
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) show that, on average, the indicators they selected send the first signal of
a crisis anywhere between a year and 18 months before the outbreak of a crisis.57 Borio and Lowe (2002)
report that the performance of their indicators improves considerably when the lead-time of the indicators
is lengthened to three years.58
7.3 Econometrically: what have we achieved?
When implementing CoPoD, the procedure used to select the set of explanatory variables involves the use
of multivariate OLS regressions with the specific objective of making a further refinement of the initial set
of macroeconomic and financial variables that was considered. This is shown in the results reported in
Section 4.4. However, since we are dealing with very small samples, OLS estimation procedures produce
coeﬃcients with large variances and high sensitivity to changes in the data. Therefore, once the set of
explanatory variables for each specification is chosen, in Section 5.2, we recover their coeﬃcients with
CoPoD, with the objective of improving their eﬃciency. The Monte Carlo experiment results presented
in Section 6 endorse the theoretical results presented in Section 2.5, which claim that in finite sample
settings, CoPoD estimators exhibit reduced variances. Thus, from the econometric point of view, we have
some assurance with respect to the selected variables for each specification (results reported in Section 4.4),
and with respect to the statistical properties of the coeﬃcients of such variables in finite sample settings
(results reported in Sections 5.2 and 6).
7.4 Economically: how consistent are our results with theoretical arguments
and empirical evidence?
When selecting the explanatory variables, we gave great weight to the consistency of their coeﬃcients
with theoretical arguments and empirical evidence. In this section, we focus on analyzing our results with
respect to those arguments.
The results obtained and discussed in this section are consistent with our earlier hypothesis. As already
mentioned in Section 3, this hypothesis implies that during the upturn of the cycle, banks sharply increase
lending as the prices of the assets that are held as collateral increase, and the state of confidence in the
system is positive. It is also during this stage that the seeds for financial imbalances are sown and the
financial vulnerability of the economy increases, as the levels of leverage of the banking system rise. When
financial imbalances unwind and market sentiment shifts, (speculative attacks may occur and, possibly,
herding behavior takes over), the prices of assets provided as collateral weaken, perhaps sharply. Sudden
changes in the system’s state of confidence have the potential to interact and become endogenous, self-
fulfilling fluctuations that possibly exacerbate the downturn of the cycle. During this stage, stress in the
financial system builds up, as evidenced by the sharp increase in the empirical frequency of loan defaults
56They analyse, among other indicators, the credit to GDP ratio, M2 over reserves ratio, credit growth and a law and order
variable.
57These papers show that credit to GDP signals on average twelve months before the outbreak of a crisis and stock prices
signal on average fourteen months before the outbreak of a crisis.
58Borio and Lowe (2002) examine combinations of indicators including credit and asset prices. They analyze cumulative
processes and use only ex-ante information.
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(PoDs) that is observed during the crisis “inside lag”. Thus, during the downturn of the cycle, a negative
relationship between PoDs (which are increasing) and asset prices (which are falling) is observed.
Results for Norway:
Table 4 shows the recovered coeﬃcients with CoPoD for Norway:
Specification 1 shows the coeﬃcients for the gap in the ratio of credit to GDP (GapCREDOVGDP)
lagged four periods, and the gap in the aggregate asset price index (GapAGGPRINDX) lagged three
periods. If we take oﬀ the Norwegian crisis “inside lag” (two years), gaps in the ratio of credit to GDP and
in the aggregate asset price index would have been signalling an increase in PoDs for two years and one
year, respectively before the outbreak of the crisis. These results are consistent with the empirical evidence
for the timing of such signals, as we pointed out above. These results are also consistent with theoretical
credit cycles à la Kiyotaki and Moore, as well as the results reported by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999),
Eichengreen and Areta (2000), Borio and Lowe (2002) and Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano (2004).
Specification 2, was augmented to include the coeﬃcients for the interest rate volatility variable (IN-
REVO1) lagged one year, and the diﬀerence between long-term minus short-term interest rates (LOMISH)
lagged two years. Parameter estimates of the Gap in Credit to GDP and the Gap in the aggregate asset
price index keep their signs at the same lags as in the previous specification, and hence are consistent
with the empirical evidence. These results indicate that increases in interest rate volatility appear to ex-
plain increases in PoDs within the “inside lag” window; confirming that interest rate volatility does aﬀect
adversely banks’ balance sheets as we discussed in Section 4.1. Furthermore, since increases in interest
rate volatility have been reported at the outbreak of crises, these results appear to be consistent with the
empirical evidence for the timing of the signals.59 LOMISH is a proxy for the expectations of growth in
the economy. We would expect that during the two years prior to the crisis (which is what the model
signals), expectations of growth would be high and values of LOMISH would increase during the boom
cycle. However, we would also expect that once the crisis breaks out, expectations of growth would decline
and values of LOMISH would decrease during the downturn of the cycle. On the other hand, it takes the
PoDs two years from the outbreak of the crisis until they reach their maximum frequency (inside lag).
After two years, PoDs start decreasing. Therefore, a positive relationship between LOMISH (lagged two
years) and the behavior of empirical defaults is consistent with our hypothesis.
In Specification 3, the results for the parameters of GapCREDOVGDP and INREVO1 are similar to
the results reported in Specification 2. However, when we recovered the coeﬃcient of the gap in the aggre-
gate asset price index (GapAGGPRINDX) lagged only one year, this variable had a negative coeﬃcient.
This result is consistent with our hypothesis.60 Once the economy goes into a downturn of asset prices
(within the “inside lag”), we would also expect a sharp increase in PoDs, as the value of the assets held
as collateral decreases. Therefore, we would anticipate that the relationship between PoDs and GapAGG-
PRINDX (lagged one period) would be negative. We also explore the explanatory power of the gap in the
ratio of M2 over international reserves. As we explained in Section 4.1, since M2 could be interpreted as a
proxy of current liabilities for the government and international reserves as a proxy of current assets, the
ratio of M2 over reserves is a proxy that indicates the extent to which the liabilities of the banking system
are backed by international reserves (Calvo and Mendoza, 1996). In the event of a crisis, individuals may
rush to convert their domestic currency deposits into foreign currency (Jorion, 2002). So we would expect
that the gap of the ratio of M2 over reserves would increase at the outbreak of the crisis, because reserves
will fall further than deposits. Therefore, as PoDs increase, GapM2OVRES also increases.
Results for Mexico:
Table 5 shows the recovered coeﬃcients with CoPoD for Mexico.
59See the Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, September 2003.
60Once more, these results are consistent with theoretical credit cycles à la Kiyotaki and Moore and the results reported
by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Eichengreen and Areta (2000), Borio and Lowe (2002) and Goodhart, Hofmann and
Segoviano (2004).
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Specification 1 shows the recovered coeﬃcients for the gap in the ratio of credit to GDP (GapCRE-
DOVGDP), the gap in the real estate price index (GapINCOCDRE) and the gap in the real share price
(GapSHAPRIRE). These variables are lagged twenty-four, twenty and fifteen periods, respectively.61 Note
again that if we take oﬀ the Mexican crisis “inside lag” (eleven quarters), GapCREDOVGDP would have
been explaining an increase in PoDs three years and one quarter before the outbreak of the crisis. Gap-
INCOCDRE would have been signalling increases in PoDs two years and one quarter before the crisis and
GapSHAPRIREL would have been explaining an increase in PoDs one year before the outbreak of the
crisis. These results are consistent with the empirical and theoretical evidence for the timing of the signals,
as we pointed out in the previous section.
Specification 2 was augmented to include the interest rate volatility (INREVO1), the gap of the
ratio of M2 over reserves (GapHCDM2OVRES) and the gap of the ratio of investment over GDP (GapIN-
VOVGDP). These variables are lagged ten, six and eight periods, respectively. The recovered coeﬃcients
of the Gaps in the credit to GDP, the real estate price index and real share price keep their signs at similar
lags as in the previous specification. These results indicate that increases in interest rate volatility appear
to explain increases in PoDs within the “inside lag” window, which confirms that interest rate volatility
does aﬀect adversely banks’ balance sheets, as documented by Mishkin (1997). Furthermore, since in-
creases in interest rate volatility have been reported at the outbreak of crises, these results appear to be
consistent with empirical evidence for the timing of the signals. As we explained before, GapM2OVRES is
a proxy that indicates to what extent the liabilities of the banking system are backed by international re-
serves (Calvo and Mendoza, 1996). Therefore, a positive coeﬃcient in this variable within the crisis “inside
lag” is consistent with the expectation that GapM2OVRES would increase as individuals rush to convert
their domestic currency deposits into foreign currency at the outbreak of the crisis. In emerging market
economies, investment virtually disappears at the outbreak of a crisis. This has been a phenomenon that
has been regarded as a “drag” from the crisis and that could cause recovery from a crisis to take longer.62
The negative coeﬃcient of GapINVOVGDP lagged eight periods (within the crisis “inside lag” window) is
consistent with this empirical fact. Therefore, as GapINVOVGDP decreases, PoDs increase.
In Specification 3, the results for the coeﬃcients of GapCREDOVGDP, INREVO1, GapM2OVRES
and GapINVOVGDP are similar to the results reported in Specification 2. However, when we recovered
the coeﬃcient of the gap of the aggregate real estate price index (GapINCOCDRE) lagged eleven periods,
this variable had a negative coeﬃcient. This result is consistent with our hypothesis. Once the economy
goes into a downturn of asset prices (within the “inside lag”), we would also expect PoDs to start rising,
as the value of the assets held as collateral decreases. Therefore, we would anticipate that the relationship
between PoDs and GapINCOCDRE (lagged eleven periods) would be negative.
In summary, despite the shortcomings of the data, the diﬀerent characteristics of the Norwegian and
Mexican economies and the particularities of their respective crises, we were able to find regularities in
the explanatory power of fluctuations in credit to GDP and fluctuations in asset prices on the empirical
frequency of loan defaults in both countries. These results indicate that cumulative processes (gaps) provide
better information than growth rates. The signs of the coeﬃcients are consistent with theoretical arguments
and empirical evidence. There is also consistency with respect to the timing when fluctuations in these
variables signal changes in the financial risk of the system.
8 Conclusions
We propose the Conditional Probability of Default Methodology for modelling the probabilities of loan
defaults by SMEs and unlisted firms as functions of identifiable macroeconomic and financial variables.
61Note that although the vector of the Mexican dependent variable only contains 23 observations (from the second quarter
of 1995 to the fourth quarter of 2004) the matrix of independent variables contains 126 observations (quarterly information
from the first quarter of 1970 to the fourth quarter of 2004); therefore, it was possible to lag the independent variables up to
twenty four quarters. The lags of the independent variables are consistent with other empirical studies. See Section 7.
62 Sturm, Berger and Haan (2004) find that the ratio of Investment to GDP is robustly related to the probability that a
country receives IMF credit.
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Thus, CoPoD allows for the estimation of PoDs conditional on the business cycle, making it possible to
measure the evolution of risk through time. The latter is achieved under the strong data restrictions
binding the credit risk modelling of SMEs and unlisted firms.
CoPoD makes a twofold contribution. From the econometric point of view, CoPoD produces estimators
that, in the setting of finite samples, are superior to OLS estimators under the mean square error criterion.63
From an economic point of view, based on theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, CoPoD involves
a procedure to select a set of explanatory variables that have a significant eﬀect on loans’ credit risk.
We present an empirical implementation of CoPoD with databases containing information on the PoDs
of loans given to SMEs and unlisted companies in Norway and Mexico. The dataset is one of few that cover
an entire business cycle and focus on SMEs and unlisted borrowers; however, the number of observations
is still small in statistical terms. Despite the limitations of the data and regardless of the diﬀerent char-
acteristics of the Norwegian and Mexican economies and the particularities of their respective crises, these
results indicate that gaps (cumulative processes) provide better information than growth rates. Results
show that increases of credit to GDP and asset prices have a significant explanatory power on the PoDs
in both countries. It is also observed that when periods of combined strong increases in credit and real
asset prices occur, there is an enhanced likelihood of stress in the financial system occurring (reflected by
increased PoDs), some two to four years ahead.
Since PoDs are explained by lagged values of relevant explanatory variables, it is possible to obtain
ex-ante measures of probabilities of loan defaults given a set of realised or simulated (in the case of stress
testing) values of macroeconomic explanatory variables. Therefore, the implementation of this methodology
opens the possibility of being able to assess the impact of macroeconomic shocks on PoDs before such
shocks have an eﬀect in empirical defaults. Ex-ante measurements of loan defaults can also be used to
evaluate the impact of macroeconomic shocks on banks’ economic capital before such shocks are reflected
upon unexpected losses. This can be achieved if the ex-ante PoDs, i.e. forecasted PoDs, are used in
conjunction with the Consistent Information Multivariate Density Optimizing (CIMDO) methodology,
which we propose to recover portfolio multivariate distributions.64
The joint implementation of the CoPoD and the CIMDO is specially useful for stress testing pur-
poses. CoPoD allows the modeller to quantify the eﬀects of macroeconomic shocks on PoDs (specified
with macroeconomic scenarios). Stressed PoDs can then be used to obtain the loan portfolio’s multivariate
distribution using the CIMDO methodology. With this distribution, it becomes possible to estimate the
change of economic capital that would be necessary to withstand a given macroeconomic shock.
Taking into consideration the dearth of data for credit risk measurement, these methodologies were
designed with the objective of improving credit risk measurement through time. We aim to provide a set of
tools that is useful for the timely recognition of risks as macroeconomic conditions change. If more timely
recognition leads to minimizing the negative eﬀects of such risks, this will potentially enhance financial
institutions’ competitive advantages and systems’ financial stability.
63Asymptotically, the CoPoD estimators are equivalent to Ordinary Least Squares estimators. Therefore, the estimators’
eﬃciency gains produced by CoPoD will tend to disappear as the sample size increases. Thus CoPoD seems to be especially
useful in settings where information is restricted. In settings where information is not restricted, CoPoD will produce
equivalent estimators than OLS; however, the latter may be easier to be implemented.
64The CIMDO methodology is presented in a companion paper, Segoviano, 2005.
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Appendix
A.1 The generalized maximum entropy rule
Using the entropy concept developed in the XIXth century by Boltzman and continued lately by Maxwell,
Gibbs, Bernoulli, Laplace, Shannon (1948) developed the “entropy of the distribution of probabilities” to
measure the uncertainty of a collection of events.
In developing this approach, Shannon (1948) supposed that an experiment with N trials (repetitions)
was carried out. This experiment had K possible outcomes (states). He assumed that N1,N2, ....., NK
represented the number of times that each outcome occurs in the experiment of lengthN , where
P
Nk = N ,
Nk > 0, and k = 1, 2, ....,K.
In this setting there are N trials and each trial has K possible outcomes; therefore, there are KN
conceivable outcomes in the sequence of N trials. Of these, a particular set of frequencies
pk =
Nk
N
or Nk = Npk for k = 1, 2, ...,K,
can be realized in a given number of ways as measured by the multiplicity factor (possible permutations).
Thus, the number of ways that a particular set of Nk is realized, can be represented by the multinomial
coeﬃcient
W =
N !
Np1!Np2!....Npk!
=
N !Q
kNk!
,
or its monotonic function
lnW = lnN !−
KX
k=1
lnNk! (A.1.1)
Given (??), Stirling’s approximation lnx! ≈ x lnx − x as 0 < x → ∞ is used to approximate each
component on the right hand side of (??). Then, for large N ,
lnW ≈ N lnN −N −
KX
k=1
lnNk lnNk +
KX
k=1
Nk
since
PK
k=1Nk = N, we get
lnW ≈ N lnN −
KX
k=1
Nk lnNk. (A.1.2)
The ratio NkN represents the frequency of the occurrence of the possible K outcomes in a sequence of length
N and NkN → pk as N →∞. Consequently (A.1.2) yields,
lnW ≈ N lnN −
KX
k=1
Npk ln (Npk)
= N lnN −
KX
k=1
Nk lnN −N
KX
k=1
pk ln pk
= −N
KX
k=1
pk ln pk.
Finally,
N−1lnW ≈ −
KX
k=1
pk ln pk (A.1.3)
H(p) = −
KX
k=1
pk ln pk
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Which is the Shannon entropy measure, where pk ln pk = 0 for pk = 0.
Jaynes (1957) proposed making use of the entropy concept to choose an unknown distribution of prob-
abilities when only partial information is available. He proposed maximizing the function presented in
equation (24), subject to the limited available data, this in order to obtain the probability vector p that
can be realized in the greatest number of ways consistent with the known data.
The rationale provided by Jaynes (1957) for choosing a particular solution, i.e. probability vector p
from partial information is known as the principle of maximum entropy or generalized maximum entropy
rule (GME). Let
L = −
KX
k
pk ln pk +
TX
t=1
λt
"
yt −
KX
k
pkft(xk)
#
+ µ
"
1−
KX
k
pk
#
, (A.1.4)
be the Lagrange function. Then, the problem of maximum entropy is to maximize L.
In this function, the information contained in the data has been formalized in 1 ≤ t ≤ T moment-
consistency constraints of the form
KP
k=1
pkft(xk) = yt. These moment-consistency-constraints are formu-
lated with T functions {f
1
(x), f
2
(x),..., fT (x)} representing the information contained in the data and
with a set of observations (averages or aggregates) {y
1
(x), y
2
(x),...,yT (x)} that are consistent with the
distribution of probabilities {p1 , p2,...,pk} . Note that the problem is under-identified if T < K.
In this function, the additivity restriction
KP
k=1
pk = 1 has to be fulfilled as well, since p represents a
probability distribution. Note also that λt represents the Lagrange multiplier of each of the 1 ≤ t ≤ T
moment-consistency constraints and µ represents the Lagrange multiplier of the probability additivity
constraint.
Using the method of Lagrange multipliers, the maximum entropy solution is given by
bpk = 1KP
k=1
exp
∙
−
TP
t=1
bλtft(xk)¸ exp
"
−
TX
t=1
bλtft(xk)# . (A.1.5)
A.2 Uniqueness of the maximum entropy solution
Note that the additivity restrictions in equation (6) are composed of K unit simplices of dimension M ≥ 2
and T unit simplices of dimension J ≥ 2. By denoting the individual simplices as fM and fJ , respectively,
the additivity constraint set can be written as the Cartesian product of these sets, c/ = fKM x fTJ .
Clearly, c/ is a non-empty and compact set because each of the components simplices is non-empty
and compact. Further, we only consider the interior of the additivity constraint set, int (c/), which
contains all p,wÀ 0. The model constraint set in equation (5) further restricts c/ to the probability
distributions that are consistent with the data. The fully restricted constraint set can be written as
c/∗ = {(p,w) ∈ int (c/) : a− xZp−Vw} .
To verify the uniqueness of the solution, note that the Hessian matrix of the objective function in
equation (4) is
∇(p,w)(p0,w0)E(p,w) =
∙
−P−1 0
0 −W−1
¸
,
whereP−1 is a (KM x KM) diagonal matrix with elements−(pkm)−1 andW−1 is a (TJ x TJ) diagonal
matrix with elements −(wtj)−1.
This matrix is negative definite for p,wÀ 0, which satisfies the suﬃcient conditions for strict concavity.
Therefore, there is a unique global maximum for the problem if, c/∗ 6= ∅.
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A.3 Large sample properties regularity conditions
Golan, Judge and Miller (1997) make use of the dual formulation of the problem to evaluate the large
sample properties of the GME estimators. The authors show that the asymptotic distribution of GME
estimators can be derived by finding the distribution of cλT. Given that cβT= Zp(cλT) is a continuous
function of cλT, they use the δ-method (Spanos, 1986) to approximate the distribution of cβT. The authors
examine the properties of a generalized entropy formulation that employs convergent functions of the
sample information. In particular, they consider the vector of weighted averages formed by dividing
X0a = X0Xβ +X0e by the sample size T−1. They claim that under the following regularity conditions,
these weighted averages converge in probability.
1. There exists a finite, positive definite matrix Q such that
lim
T→∞
µ
X 0X
T
¶
= Q.
2. E(e) = 0, V ar(e) =
P
e, and F (e) satisfies the Lindeberg condition (Billingsley 1986, equation 27.8)
T−1
TX
t=1
Z
c
kek2 dF (e)→ 0,
where c =
n
e : kek > ε√T
o
for ε > 0.
3. The variance-covariance matrix of ε = X
0e√
T
converges to a finite, positive definite matrix
lim
T→∞
µ
X0ΣeX
T
¶
= Σ∗.
4. β0 ∈ int(L).
5. V =O
¡
T−1
¢
.
A.4 Information measures
The amount of information captured by the GME model can be measured by using a normalized entropy
(information measure). This statistic (Golan, 1988) measures the importance of the contribution of each
data constraint (t=1,2,...,t) in reducing uncertainty. As we have already mentioned, the maximum level of
entropy uncertainty results when the information-moment constraints are not enforced and the distribution
of probabilities is maximally dispersed, and thus uniformly distributed (each possible outcome is equally
probable and therefore the distribution is maximally uninformative). As we add each piece of eﬀective data,
a departure from the uniform distribution results and implies a reduction of uncertainty. The proportion
of the remaining total uncertainty is measured by the normalized entropy
S (bp) =
⎛
⎝
−
hPK
k=1
PM
m=1 bpkm ln ¡bpkm¢i
K ln(M)
⎞
⎠ , (A.3.1)
S (bw) =
⎛
⎝
−
hPT
t=1
PJ
j=1 bwtj ln ¡ bwtj¢i
T ln(J)
⎞
⎠ ,
where S (bp) and S (bw) ∈ [0, 1] . Values S (bp) = 0 and S (bw) = 0 imply no uncertainty. This is the
case when the distribution is maximally informative in that p and w degenerate on particular values, e.g.bpkm = 1 for some km and bpkn = 0 for all kn 6= km and bwtj = 1 for some tj and bwtn = 0 for all tn 6= tj.
Alternatively, S (bp) = 1 and S (bw) = 1 implies perfect uncertainty. Note that whereas the variance of a
discrete distribution measures the concentration of mass about the mean, S (bp) and S (bw) measure the
concentration of mass over the support of the p and w distributions.
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An analog measure, the information index (Soofi, 1992) can be defined as
RI (bp) = 1− S (bp) , (A.3.2)
RI (bw) = 1− S (bw) .
We can interpret RI (bp) and RI (bw) as statistics to measure the reduction in uncertainty.
A.5 Procedure to obtain long-term trends
As we stated in Section 4.3.1, for each analyzed variable, we estimate “gaps” with respect to long-term
trends. In order to compute the latter, we use “dynamic” Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filters using information
from 1970. This procedure is illustrated as follows:
Table 8: Gaps with a dynamic HP filter
Period Contemporaneous Lag1 (-1)
t1 GapVar1 = Var1-HTDVar11 GapVar(-1)1 = Var0-HTDVar
1
0
t2 GapVar2 = Var2-HTDVar22 GapVar(-1)2 = Var1-HTDVar
2
1
t3 GapVar3 = Var3-HTDVar33 GapVar(-1)3 = Var2-HTDVar
3
2
t4 GapVar4 = Var4-HTDVar44 GapVar(-1)4 = Var3-HTDVar
4
3
t5 GapVar5 = Var5-HTDVar55 GapVar(-1)5 = Var4-HTDVar
5
4
Var refers to the variable and HTDVar is the HP trend component of the analyzed variable.
Subscripts refer to the time of the observation.
Superscripts refer to the information set included.
For example, let us assume that we were currently at t3 and we wanted to estimate the gap for a
given variable at time t3 (contemporaneous gap). First, using a HP filter, we would include information
from 1970 up until t3 to compute the trend component (superscript in the HP trend component, e.g.,
HTDV ariable3). Second, we would obtain the diﬀerence between the value of the variable at t3 (subscript
in the variable component. e.g., V ariable3) and the value of the trend component at t3 (subscript in the
trend component e.g., HTDV ariable3); therefore, GapV ariable3 = V ariable3 − HTDV ariable33. Note
that we only use information up to the period that we analyze, e.g. t3, because at t3 an analyst would only
have information up to this date. In order to estimate Lags for the gaps we followed a similar procedure.
If we were at t3 and we wanted to estimate the credit gap, lagged one period. First, using an HP filter, we
would include information from 1970 up until t3 to compute the trend component (superscript in the HP
trend component, e.g., HTDV ariable3). However, now in the second step, we would obtain the diﬀerence
between the value of the variable at t2 (lagged one period, e.g., subscript in the variable component,
e.g., V ariable2) and the value of the trend component at t2 (lagged one period, e.g., subscript in the
trend component, e.g., HTDV ariable2); therefore, GapV ariable(−1)3 = V ariable2 − HTDV ariable32.
This procedure was repeated for all the included lags.
A.6 Results with growth rates
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Table 9: OLS results for Norway: growth rates
OLS results for Norway: growth rates
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value
Constant 3.663943 0.0000 3.639994 0.0000 3.658267 0.0000
GrCREDOVGDP(-7) 0.475878 0.0116 0.415443 0.0000 0.275960 0.0243
GrAGGPRINDX(-6) 0.168454 0.1306 0.254088 0.0010
INREVO1 1468.7580 0.0005 959.3723 0.0072
GrM2OVRES(-3) 0.113979 0.0015 0.119739 0.0260
GrAGGPRINDX(-1) -0.203191 0.0543
R-squared 0.4177 0.8586 0.7461
Adjusted R-squared 0.3118 0.7958 0.6332
Akaike criterion -3.1498 -4.2796 -3.6940
Schwarz criterion -3.0129 -4.0513 -3.4658
F-statistic 3.9449 13.6627 6.6100
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0511 0.0007 0.0091
Dependent Variable: aNor. Method: OLS. Sample: 1988-2001. Included observations: 14.
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=2).
Table 10: OLS results for Mexico: growth rates
OLS results for Mexico: growth rates
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value Coeﬃcient p-value
Constant 2.736912 0.0000 2.634441 0.0000 2.481142 0.0000
GrCREDOVGDP(-26) 3.506881 0.0059 3.189803 0.0046
GrINCOCDRE(-25) 11.360630 0.0003 8.793358 0.0001
INREVO1(-10) 3360.2340 0.0000 3176.2660 0.0000 4494.4460 0.0000
LOMISH(-11) -0.039998 0.0000
GrM2OVRES(-14) 0.444616 0.0001
GrINVOVGDP(-14) -2.760626 0.0003
GrCREDOVGDP(-25) 4.268453 0.0031
GrINCOCDRE(-6) -7.002888 0.0561
GrSHAPRIRE(-8) -958600 0.0457
R-squared 0.7061 0.9270 0.5881
Adjusted R-squared 0.6597 0.8996 0.4966
Akaike criterion 0.9789 -0.1530 1.4032
Schwarz criterion 1.1764 0.1925 1.6501
F-statistic 15.2133 33.8596 6.4257
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021
Dependent Variable: aMex, Method: OLS. Sample: 1995:2 2000:4. Included observations: 23.
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=2).
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Table 11: CoPoD (GME) results for Norway: growth rates
CoPoD (GME) results for Norway: growth rates
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
Constant 3.662104 3.639671 3.659073
GrCREDOVGDP(-7) 0.464223 0.419596 0.285415
GrAGGPRINDX(-6) 0.174416 0.255577
INREVO1 1463.9580 925.73395
GrM2OVRES(-3) 0.113147 0.121864
GrAGGPRINDX(-1) -0.205878
Dependent Variable: aNor. Method: CoPoD. Sample: 1988-2001. Included observations: 14.
Table 12: CoPoD results for Mexico: growth rates
CoPoD (GME) results for Mexico: growth rates
Variables Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
Constant 2.782681 2.635378 2.498623
GrCREDOVGDP(-26) 3.609360 3.144585
GrINCOCDRE(-25) 12.679111 9.010519
INREVO1(-10) 3218.808500 3153.52060 4417.79550
LOMISH(-11) -0.030181
GrM2OVRES(-14) 0.441605
GrINVOVGDP(-14) -2.707960
GrCREDOVGDP(-25) 4.089978
GrINCOCDRE(-6) -6.235022
GrSHAPRIRE(-8) -0.946989
Dependent Variable: aMex, Method: CoPoD. Sample: 1995:2 2000:4. Included observations: 23.
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